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JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court had jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2-2(3)(j), as a final order of a court of record over which the Utah Court of Appeals did not 
have original jurisdiction. On March 3, 1997, the Clerk of the Utah Supreme Court gave notice 
that this appeal had been transferred to the Utah Court of Appeals. The Utah Supreme Court has 
discretion to make such transfers under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4). Thus, the Utah Court of 
Appeals has jurisdiction to hear this appeal. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Should the trial court's holding that Plaintiff/Appellant Michael O. Longley lacked 
standing to contest water right extension applications be reversed for denial of due process of law 
guaranteed to Mr. Longley by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and 
Article 1, Section 7, of the Utah Constitution, when the failure to obtain standing by timely 
protesting the extension applications was caused by the State Engineer's refusal to give Mr. 
Longley actual notice of the administrative proceeding after Mr. Longley—and only Mr. Longley— 
had specifically requested such notice and provided his name and address. 
2. Should the trial court's holding that Mr. Longley did not have standing to protest 
extension applications be reversed when the failure to obtain standing by timely protesting the 
extension applications was caused by Appellees' failure to sufficiently describe new points of 
diversion of water and the diligence claimed in the published notice of the administrative 
proceeding as required by statute. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This Court reviews a grant of summary judgment for correctness, without deference to the 
trial court's legal conclusions. Summary judgment "is generally considered a drastic remedy.'' 
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Timm v. Dewsnup. 851 P.2d 1178, 1181 (Utah 1993). and the appellate court "views all 
inferences therefrom in a light most favorable to finding a material issue of fact. Jackson v. 
Righter, 891 P.2d 1387 (Utah 1995): Beach v. University of Utah. 726 P.2d 413, 414 (Utah 
1986). This Court "review[s] the trial court's legal conclusions, including its conclusion that the 
material facts are not disputed, for correctness." Kunz & Co. v. State. 913 P.2d 765, 768 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1996). This standard allows the Court to make its own conclusions and does not 
obligate the Court to defer to the trial court. M. (citing State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 
1994)); Brown v. Weis. 871 P.2d 552, 559 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES, RULES AND REGULATIONS 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, AMENDMENT V [Due process of law clause.]: 
No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law 
. . nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation. 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, AMENDMENT XIV, Section 1. [Due process of law.]: 
|A11 persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction 
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State 
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens 
of the United States; . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection 
of the laws. 
UTAH CONSTITUTION, Article 1, Sec. 7. [Due process of law.]: 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law. 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, § 73-3-12(1): 
(e)(i) The state engineer shall publish notice once each week for three successive weeks 
in a newspaper of general circulation in the county in which the source of supply is 
located. 
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(e)(ii) The notice shall contain information that will inform the public of the diligence 
claimed and the reason for the request. 
UTAH ADMINISTRATIVE CODE, R655-6-17: 
B. Action on the Request [for Reconsideration]. Upon the filing of a Request for 
reconsideration, the Division shall review the Request and may within 20 da>s do an> or 
all of the following: 
1. issue any preliminary order; 
2. summarily deny the Request, in whole or in part; 
3. summarily grant the relied requested, in whole or in part; 
4. set a time for a re-hearing. 
C. If the Division does not issue an order within 20 days, the Request shall be considered 
to be denied. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below. 
This action has its origin in Change Application No. a-6393 ("Change Application") filed 
in 1970 with the State Engineer by Defendant/Appellee Leucadia Financial Corporation, dba and 
fka Terracor ("Leucadia") on two of its water rights. (Record on Appeal ("R.") at 161-62, 271-
72.) The Change Application to move the point of diversion on those two water rights to six 
proposed new wells was approved by the State Engineer. Under Utah law, Leucadia had three 
>ears in which to make the changes approved under the Change Application and to file proof of 
completion of said changes with the State Engineer. (R. 161-62, 271-72.) Leucadia sought and 
properly obtained four extensions of this deadline from the State Engineer. (R. 161-62, 271-72.) 
The fourth extension, granted in 1985. was expressly conditioned upon it being the last extension 
and set November 30, 1989 as the final deadline for filing the required proof. (R. 40, 162.) The 
State Engineer's written decision clearly warned Leucadia that if such proof was not filed b\ 
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November 30, 1989, the Change Application would lapse. (R. 40.) On November 30. 1989, the 
very day of the deadline, Leucadia filed a false and unsigned Proof of Permanent Change 
("Proof). (R. 163.) In a Memorandum Decision issued on July 10, 1992, the State Engineer 
found that the facilities identified in the Proof did not exist and declared the Change Application 
to be lapsed. (R. 49-50.) 
Leucadia filed a request for reconsideration of the lapsing of the Change Application but 
the State Engineer did not act on that request within the statutory time of 20 days allowed and 
the request for reconsideration was automatically denied on August 19, 1992 under Utah Code 
Ann. § 63-46b-13.! (R. 52, 54, 164.) On August 20, 1992, the State Engineer purported to 
grant the request for reconsideration. (R. 54, 164.) The illegal grant of reconsideration was 
based on a statutorily defective fifth Extension Request filed 10 months after the November 30, 
1989 deadline for such a request. Upon reconsideration on January 31, 1994, the State Engineer 
reinstated the Change Application and asked Leucadia to submit a properly completed fifth 
Extension. This occurred over four years after the November 30, 1989 final deadline on the 
Change Application. (R. 58-59, 165.) The State Engineer published notice of this fifth 
Extension Request in February of 1994, then republished in April of 1994 to correct some errors, 
but such re-published notice was still defective and inadequate. (R. 61, 165-66, 290.) 
In 1989, Mr. Longley contacted the State Engineer's Office seeking to intervene in the 
matter to protest the extension approvals to protect his water rights. (R. 330-31, 353-54. 365, 
515, 530, 556-57, 562-63, 565-67.) He specifically requested actual notice of any further action 
by the State Engineer. (R. 330-31, 353-54. 365, 515, 530, 556-57, 562-63. 565-67.) Subsequent 
1
 All section references are to the Utah Code Annotated unless otherwise indicated. 
References to Title 63 are to the 1993 edition and references to Title 73 are to the 1989 edition. 
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to this request, Mr. Longley learned that the Change Application had lapsed. However, despite 
his request for actual notice and the intervening lapsing of the Change Application, the State 
Engineer's Office gave no actual notice to Mr. Longley of any subsequent action. (R. 330-31, 
353-54, 365, 515, 530, 556-57, 562-63, 565-67.) Instead the State Engineer merely published 
notice of the Fifth Extension request in the local newspaper legal notices. (R. 61, 165-66, 290.) 
The deadline to timel> file a protest to the fifth Extension Request was April 19, 1994. 
Mr. Longley first learned of the reinstated Change Application and the fifth Extension 
Request thereon approximately one year later and immediately prepared and mailed a protest 
letter dated April 3, 1995. (R. 328.) The State Engineer thereafter granted the fifth Extension 
Request by a Memorandum Decision dated June 19, 1995. (R. 328.) While Mr. Longley was 
unable to timely file a protest due to lack of notice, he filed a timely request for reconsideration 
of that decision, but that request was denied by the State Engineer on the grounds that his initial 
protest was not timely. (R. 100-08, 109-12, 167.) Mr. Longley then sought judicial review by 
the District Court of the State Engineer's June 19, 1995 Memorandum Decision approving the 
fifth Extension Application. (R. 157-176.) The trial court granted Summary Judgment in favor 
of the Defendants, finding that because Mr. Longley did not participate in the administrative 
proceedings noticed only in the newspaper by timely filing a protest, he did not have standing 
to appeal the approval of the fifth Extension Request to the district court. (R. 534-38.) 
IL Statement of Material Facts 
1. This action relates to a water rights change application. Change Application No. 
a-6393, filed with the State Engineer by Leucadia in 1970 on two water rights in the AtkinviUe 
area south of the Virgin River. After this Change Application was approved, Leucadia had three 
\ears in which to make the proposed changes and file proof thereof with the State Engineer. 
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Leucadia thereafter sought and obtained from the State Engineer four extensions of this deadline. 
(R. 161-62, 271-72.) 
2. The fourth Extension Request was granted by a Memorandum Decision dated 
December 30, 1985, upon the express condition that "this shall be the last request granted and 
proof of appropriation shall be submitted on or before [November 30, 1989J or the application 
will be lapsed. Requests for further extension of time will be denied." (R. 40, 162.) (A copy 
of this Memorandum Decision is attached as Exhibit A in the Appendix.) 
3. Mr. Longley contacted the State Engineer's Office in October or November of 
1989 to ascertain the status of the Change Application and to see if he could intervene in any way 
at that point in time. Importantly, he also requested to be given notice of any further action on 
the matter. The State Engineer's office advised Mr. Longley, "a concerned developer in [the] 
Hurricane area," that the terms of the last Extension Request were contained in the December 30, 
1985 Memorandum Decision. Mr. Longley provided the Office of the State Engineer with his 
name and address at that time. (R. 330-31, 353-54, 365, 515, 530, 556-57, 562-63, 565-67.) (A 
copy of the internal memorandum documenting Longley's request is attached as Exhibit B in the 
Appendix.) 
4. On November 30, 1989, Leucadia filed a patently false and un-notarized Proof of 
Permanent Change (attached hereto as Exhibit C in the Appendix) stating that six wells with 
totalizing meters, 24,000 feet of conveyance lines, booster pumps, a pressure reduction box, a 
metering station, and a connection to St. George City's Quail Creek transmission line had been 
constructed. (R. 42-47, 163.) 
5. On July 11, 1990, representatives of the State Engineer inspected the alleged 
facilities and found, inter alia, that there were "no wells equipped, no totalizing meters, no 
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pipeline, and no connection into the St. George-Quail Creek pipeline as stated in the proof. 
There is no evidence that water had been placed to beneficial use." (R. 49-50, 163.) (A copy 
of this report is attached hereto as Exhibit D in the Appendix.) 
6. In a letter received September 21, 1990, Leucadia requested that the proof of 
appropriation previousl} submitted be withdrawn and that the State Engineer "consider [another] 
reinstatement and extension of time." A fifth Extension Request form allegedly accompanied that 
letter. (R. 56. 164.) 
7. On July 10, 1992, the State Engineer issued a Memorandum Decision (Exh. D) 
ordering that the proof of appropriation be rejected and that the Change Application be lapsed 
for failure to comply with statutory requirements and to place the water to beneficial use. (R. 
49-50.) This Memorandum Decision also contained a notice concerning appeal procedures and 
stated that when a request for reconsideration is filed, the "Request for Reconsideration is 
considered denied when no action is taken 20 days after the Request is filed." (R. 49-50.) This 
is in accordance with Subsection C. of Utah Admin. Code § R655-6-17. (R. 163.) 
8. Subsection B. of Utah Admin. Code § R655-6-17 sets forth the scope of the State 
Engineer's authority when a request for reconsideration is filed and limits such authority to action 
taken within 20 da\s of the filing of the request for reconsideration. (R. 164.) 
9. On July 30, 1992, Leucadia filed a request for reconsideration of the State 
Engineer's July 10, 1992 Memorandum Decision. (R. 164.) 
10. The State Engineer's office sent Leucadia a letter (attached hereto as Exhibit E in 
the Appendix) on August 3, 1992 stating that request for reconsideration was received on Jul} 
30. 1992 and that "[i]f no action is taken within 20 days of the date the request was received in 
our office, the request is considered denied." (R. 52, 164.) 
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11. The State Engineer took no action on the request for reconsideration within 20 
days of its filing. (R. 164.) 
12. On August 20. 1992, the 21st day after the filing of the request for reconsideration 
and following a faxed communication for Leucadia's counsel urging action before the expiration 
of the 20 day period, the State Engineer belatedly issued a letter purporting to grant the already 
denied request for reconsideration. (R. 54, 164.) 
13. On January 31, 1994, the State Engineer's Office returned the fifth Extension 
Request application form allegedly filed on September 21, 1990 to Leucadia as incomplete 
because the affidavit was not notarized. The transmittal letter (attached hereto as Exhibit F in 
the Appendix) notified Leucadia that it had 10 days "to return the extension request properly 
completed or the application will lapse." (R. 56, 164.) 
14. However, without receipt of a properly completed extension request, the State 
Engineer issued an Amended Memorandum Decision on that same day, January 31, 1994, stating 
that because the proof had been withdrawn and an extension request had been received, that the 
July 10, 1992 Memorandum was rescinded and the Change Application was reinstated with a 
September 21, 1990 filing date and that the fifth Extension Request be processed anew. (R. 58-
59, 165.) (A copy of the Amended Memorandum Decision is attached hereto as Exhibit G in the 
Appendix.) 
15. Without any actual notice to Mr. Longley, the State Engineer had the fifth 
Extension Request prepared for publication beginning on February 3. 1994. also without even 
having a properly completed extension request on file. (R. 61.) Defects in that notice resulting 
in the notice being re-published in April. 1994. Protests were required to be filed by April 19, 
1994. However, the second notice was also defective on several counts. The second notice failed 
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to state the diligence claimed by the applicant in developing the water and in placing it to 
beneficial use and it failed to state the reasons for the requested extension, both as expressly 
required by Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-12(l)(e)(ii). Furthermore, the legal descriptions of the 
proposed new diversion points were completely inadequate to give anyone notice of their location. 
The April 1994 published notice (attached hereto as Exhibit H in the Appendix) listed the 
"hereafter" diversion points as follows: 
(1) S 50 W2531, 
(2) S 2343 E 253 from NW Cor, Sec 25, 
(3) S 50 E 50 fromNW Cor, 
(4) S 50 W 66, 
(5) S 2343 W 50 from NE Cor, 
(6) S 2343 E 297 from NW Cor, Sec 25, T42S, R14W 
The legal description for diversion point numbers (1) and (4) have no reference to any monument 
or corner. There is no reference to a section number for diversion point numbers (1), (3), (4) and 
(5). Only diversion point number (6) references a township and range. Furthermore, a baseline 
reference, an essential element of any legal description, is not identified for any of the diversion 
points. (R. 165-66, 290.) 
16. The fifth Extension Request form (attached hereto as Exhibit I in the Appendix) 
was re-filed on February 3, 1994 with the completed affidavit required by statute. This form 
shows on its face that the last proof due date was November 30, 1989 and that the form was first 
stamped received by the State Engineer's Office on February 3, 1994. (R. 166.) 
17. The fifth Extension Request was protested by Hurricane City and Washington 
County Water Conservancy District prior to the protest deadline and by Winding Rivers 
Associates and Mr. Longley after the protest deadline, both claiming defective notice and that the 
Change Application had lapsed long ago. Mr. Longley's protest was sent on April 3. 1995 and 
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again requested notice of any further action. (The protest is attached as Exhibit J in the 
Appendix.) Mr. Longley's protest was also based on his belief that approval of the fifth 
Extension Request would impair his vested water rights. The Conservancy District's protest was 
withdrawn after a settlement agreement between the Conservancy District and Leucadia was 
signed. (R. 166.) 
18. On June 19, 1995, the State Engineer issued a Memorandum Decision granting the 
fifth Extension Request. This Memorandum Decision recognized the two timely protests and the 
"late" protest of Winding River Associates but not the "late" protest of Mr. Longley. The 
Memorandum Decision did not expressly address any of the protests or the objections raised 
therein, including the jurisdictional, procedural, and notice defects or the substantive claims of 
impairment of existing water rights. The Memorandum Decision (attached hereto as Exhibit K 
in the Appendix) recites the statement in the 1985 Memorandum decision that any subsequent 
request for extension of time will be denied. (R. 85-87, 166.) 
19. The sole basis cited for granting the fifth Extension Request was that the City of 
St. George had allegedly entered into an agreement to purchase the subject water rights if the 
Extension Request is approved. The Memorandum Decision specifically ordered that "This 
extension is approved only for use by the City of St. George to be used to meet the city's 
reasonable future needs and the right must be conveyed to the city, prior to November 30. 1996," 
the new proof due-date. (R. 85-87, 167.) 
20. On or about July 5, 1995, a group of 34 individuals, a ranch, and Hurricane Valley 
Mutual Water Company filed a request for reconsideration of the June 19, 1995 Memorandum 
Decision. (R. 89-108, 167.) 
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21. On July 10, 1995, the State Engineer received Mr. Longley's request for 
reconsideration dated July 7, 1995 concerning the June 19, 1995 Memorandum Decision. (R. 
100-108, 167.) 
22. On July 19. 1995, the State Engineer sent out letters to those requesting 
reconsideration, stating in each case that they were not "aggrieved parties" because they had not 
been a party to the administrative proceedings. (R. 109-12, 167.) 
23. Mr. Longley initiated this action on August 18, 1995 seeking judicial review of 
the State Engineer's action in this matter. (R. 167.) 
24. The State Engineer's Office lost the entire file relating to the subject water rights, 
change application, extension requests, and protests thereto for a significant period of time in 
1995. The State Engineer has admitted that it may not be possible to verify that the file, as 
recovered, was complete. (R. 333-37.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Mr. Longley has been denied the opportunity to protect his water rights by contesting the 
illegal fifth Extension Request of Leucadia's water rights application on the grounds that he did 
not timely participate in the administrative proceeding before the State Engineer. In other words, 
by failing to respond to the newspaper notice within the prescribed time, the trial court held that 
Mr. Longley lacked standing to appeal in the District Court. However, Mr. Longley did not file 
a timely protest simply because he was not given constitutionally or statutorily adequate notice 
that he needed to file one. 
Because of the State Engineer's July 10, 1992 decision lapsing the Change Application 
and the automatic denial of Leucadia's request for reconsideration thereof coupled with the fact 
that Mr. Longley-and only Mr. Longley-had given the State Engineer his name and address with 
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the request that he be contacted in the event of any action on the Change Application, the 
subsequent notice solely by newspaper publication of the fifth Extension Request was not 
constitutionally adequate under the due process clauses of both the United States and the Utah 
Constitutions. The published notice itself was also constitutionally and statutorily defective. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE STATE ENGINEERS FAILURE TO GIVE MR. LONGLEY ADEQUATE 
NOTICE OF THE FIFTH EXTENSION REQUEST VIOLATED 
CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES OF DUE PROCESS. 
Mr. Longley's federal and state constitutional challenges initially turn on whether he had 
a protected property interest being adversely affected by state action in the aforementioned 
administrative proceedings.2 Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LoudermilL 470 U.S. 532, 538 (1985) 
(citing Board of Reuents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576-578 (1972)). If he did, then the State 
Engineer was required to afford him due process. IdL See also Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 
471, 481 (1972). What process was due will be discussed in section I.B., while section I.A. will 
focus upon the nature of Mr. Longley's property interests. 
A. Mr. Longley Has Protected Property Interests and is Therefore Entitled to 
Due Process. 
"Property interests are not created by the Constitution." Id Rather, "they are created and 
their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent 
source such as state law—rules or understandings that secure certain benefits and that support 
claims of entitlement to those benefits." Roth, 408 U.S. at 577. A property interest is therefore 
"more than an abstract need or desire" for something. IcL Instead, to have a protected property 
interest, a person must "have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it." IdL 
Cases subsequent to Roth have broadly defined the concept of constitutionally protected 
property interests or entitlements. Thus, in Tulsa Professional Collection Serv.. Inc. v. Pope. 485 
2
 "Utah's constitutional guarantee of due process is substantially the same as the due process 
guarantees contained in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution." 
In re Worthen, 926 P.2d 853, 876 (Utah 1996). Therefore, the remainder of this brief will 
analyze the due process issues under both state and federal constitutional law. 
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U.S. 478, 485 (1988), the United States Supreme Court held that an unsecured claim—a potential 
cause of action against a decedent's estate—was a protected property interest and stated that 
"[l]ittle doubt remains that such an intangible interest is property protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment." See also Matter of Estate of Anderson, 821 P.2d 1169 (Utah 1991). And in Logan 
v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 428, 429-31 (1982), the Court held that a cause of 
action under Illinois' Fair Employment Practices Act was a protected property interest, 
reaffirming the holding in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 
(1950), "that a cause of action is a species of property protected by the Fourteenth Amendment's 
Due Process Clause." Zimmerman Brush, 455 U.S. at 428.3 
Since the United States Supreme Court has been willing to define unsecured claims and 
potential causes of action as protected property interests, it cannot seriously be doubted that Mr. 
Longley's vested water rights, and his asserted claims in this case are protected property interests 
for purposes of the federal and state constitutions. Nonetheless, a brief discussion of the 
independent sources and understandings from which those rights and claims spring is justified if 
only to further cement the fact that Mr. Longley has protected property interests and to point out 
that those interests will inevitably be affected by changes in Leucadia's water uses. As the 
following discussion illustrates, water rights and claims thereon are particularly fragile property 
interests clearly deserving of at least minimal constitutional protection. 
3
 See also Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 281-282 (1980) (noting that state tort 
claims are arguably a "species of 'property' protected by the Due Process Clause"); Boddie v. 
Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 380 (1971) (interpreting the Due Process Clause as preventing States 
from denying potential litigants access to adjudicatory procedures when it would be "the 
equivalent of denying them an opportunity to be heard upon their claimed rightfs]"). 
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The right to use water has long been recognized by Utah courts as a property right for 
which the water user is entitled to compensation if taken. See Mo\le v. Salt Lake City, 176 P.2d 
882 (Utah 1947); Sigurd Citv v. State. 142 P.2d 154 (Utah 1943).4 There can be no doubt, then, 
that Mr. Longley's water rights and his cause of action to defend those rights are recognized and 
protected property interests. As one distinguished commentator has said, speaking of water rights, 
" 'While the law gives absolute and unqualified certainty to few property interests and may 
ascribe different degrees of security to different interests in or uses of a resource, it generally 
follows a strong policy of encouraging enterprise and development with a system of property 
rights that will give some assurance that the activity will not be subjected to premature 
termination without compensation/'0 
4
 "Under the modern form of the appropriation doctrine, a water right may be described 
as a state administrative grant that allows the use of a specific quantity of water for a specific 
beneficial purpose, if water is available in the source free from the claims of others with earlier 
appropriations." George A. Gould & Douglas L. Grant, Cases and Materials on Water Law 6 
(5th ed. 1995). It is well-recognized that " '[w]ater uses may add substantially to the value of 
land, and most require a substantial investment in facilities for withdrawing and using it.' " IcL 
at 10 n.l (quoting Frank J. Trelease, Federal-State Relations in Water Law. National Water 
Comm'n, Legal Study No. 5, at 5-6 (1971)). " 'The purpose behind much of water law is to 
insure that water users will receive a future water supply that will enable them to continue their 
uses, plan for the future and realize their expectations/ " IdL 
5
 1(1 Another commentator has said: 
The function of this system of law was to ration a scarce resource and to 
promote economic development. The rationing principle adopted-first come, first 
served—is a familiar, if unsophisticated, means of allocating the use of a scarce 
resource. . . . 
% * % 
[But] [t]his favor bestowed upon the appropriation system in the West 
cannot be explained solely by the necessity of adopting an elementary rule in a 
frontier society. . . . It seems, rather, that the reason for the endurance of the 
appropriation system is found in the economic goals that the system serves. The 
system promotes investment by giving security of use. Prior appropriation said 
in effect: Come West, take up land and water, and they shall be yours. 
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Furthermore, the Utah legislature obviously recognizes the property aspects of water rights 
and the omnipresent potential for interference with those rights. It has designed a water rights 
system which requires notice of applications to change or acquire a particular use, presupposing 
that the approval, rejection, or change of one water right or use can affect the vested rights of 
other water users. For example, permanent or temporary changes in points of diversion, place 
of use, or purpose of use "may not be made if it impairs any vested right without just 
compensation." Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-3(2)(b) (1996 Supp.). See also Badger v. Brooklyn 
Canal Co., 922 P.2d 745, 750 (Utah 1996). Temporary changes that impair the water rights of 
others require the State Engineer to "give notice of the [change] application to any person whose 
rights may be affected by the change." Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-3(6)(c) (1996 Supp.). And 
applications to appropriate or permanently change even small amounts of water require notice. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-5.6(2)(b) (1996 Supp.). Also, the State Engineer must consider 
George A. Gould & Douglas L. Grant, Cases and Materials on Water Law 9 (5th ed. 1995) 
(quoting Charles J. Meyers, A Historical and Functional Analysis of the Appropriation Svstem, 
National Water Commission, Legal Study No. 5, at 3-6 (1971)) (emphasis added). 
For these, and other policy reasons, courts throughout the West have long recognized that 
water rights are constitutionally protected property rights. See, e.g.. State of Washington Dept. 
of Ecology v. Grimes, 852 P.2d 1044, 1054-55 (Wash. 1993) (citing Department of Ecology v. 
Adsit. 694 P.2d 1065 (Wash. 1985)) ("A vested water right is a type of private property that is 
subject to the Fifth Amendment prohibition on takings without just compensation."); Farmers 
Irrigation Co. v. Colorado Game & Fish ComtiTn. 369 P.2d 557, 559-60 (Colo. 1962) ("A 
priority to the use of water . . . is a property right and as such is fully protected by the 
constitutional guaranties relating to property in general."); In re Chumstick Creek Drainage 
Basin, 694 P.2d 1065, 1069 (Wash. 1985) (state has "recognized that water rights must receive 
due process protection" since 1907). Though Utah Courts have not had occasion to squarely 
recognize the constitutional dimensions of water rights, they have long held that they are 
interests in real property. In re Bear River Drainage Area, 2 Utah 2d 208, 211, 271 P.2d 846, 
848(1954). See also Salt Lake City Corp. v. Cahoon & Maxfield Irrigation Co., 879 P.2d 248, 
251-52 (Utah 1994) (holding stock in mutual irrigation corporation is an interest in property); 
Jensen v. Morgan, 844 P.2d 287, 289 (Utah 1992) (recognizing the need to provide notice to 
water users whose rights will be affected in a general adjudication). 
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existing rights before approving or rejecting an application, Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-8(1 )(b) 
(1989), and can only approve an application for change that conflicts with existing rights upon 
the condition that conflicting rights are acquired, Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-3(7)(b) (1996 Supp.). 
These statutory requirements of notice to interested persons and State Engineer review of 
the impact change or approval will have on other water rights—even small changes—explicitly 
recognize two fundamental realities of Western water law. First, water is a scarce, and therefore 
valuable, resource.6 Second, water rights do not exist in a vacuum and, consequently, can never 
be viewed in isolation from the water rights of others. To borrow from popular parlance, "We 
all live downstream." This latter principle is well recognized in the water law literature and by 
courts of this state. For example, it is almost axiomatic that the rights of a junior appropriator 
begin at the limits of the rights of the senior. See Gould & Grant, supra at 69 n. 1. Also, an " 
'appropriator is entitled to have the stream conditions maintained substantially as they existed at 
the time he made his appropriation,'" East Bench Irrigation Co. v. Desert Irrigation Co., 2 Utah 
2d 170, 271 P.2d 449, 454 (1954) (citations omitted), and "has a vested right . . . insist that such 
conditions be not changed to the detriment of his own right," kL See also Farmers Highline 
Canal & Reservoir Co. v. City of Golden, 272 P.2d 629, 631-32 (Colo. 1954) ( "Equally well 
established ... is the principle that junior appropriators have vested rights in the continuation of 
stream conditions as they existed at the time of their respective appropriations, and that 
subsequent to such appropriations they may successfully resist all proposed changes in points of 
diversion and use of water from that source which in any way materially injures or adversely 
affects their rights."). The Utah Supreme Court recently recognized that a change in use by one 
6
 See supra notes 4 & 5. 
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water user likely affects well users in the same general region. See Badger, 922 P.2d at 747-48, 
751. In that case, plaintiffs claiming water rights in private wells protested changes in an 
irrigation company's artesian well water rights, claiming that the changes would "lower the water 
table in the region of their wells, thus impairing their rights." IdL at 748. According to the 
Supreme Court, those plaintiffs had "articulated claims which, if valid, would clearly entitle them 
to the full benefits of [Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-8(1)]," id. at 751 (emphasis added), which requires 
the State Engineer to evaluate the effect a proposed change of use will have on "existing rights." 
Mr. Longley, like the plaintiffs in Badger, has articulated claims that clearly entitle him 
to protest the current applications. (R. 157-176, 326-509.) Clearly Mr. Longley's water rights 
are a valuable private property interest. Likewise, it is certain that approval of the subject 
Extension Requests can or will adversely affect Mr. Longley's water rights. (R. 157-176.) 
Obviously, Mr. Longley has not had the opportunity to demonstrate on the merits just how this 
might happen and will not have such an opportunity to be heard unless he has standing to 
participate in a judicial review proceeding. Unlike the plaintiffs in Badger, who may have 
waived their protest rights by failing to inform the state engineer of their vested rights in a 
proceeding before him,7 Mr. Longley has been denied, by the statutory and constitutional 
inadequacy of the State Engineer's notice, (R. 61, 290), the opportunity to take advantage of his 
constitutional right to protest state action that would affect his vested property rights.8 
7
 The private well plaintiffs apparently appeared before the State Engineer since the 
Supreme Court notes that "[t]he proceedings before the State Engineer were preserved on a tape 
recording, but that recording contains gaps and appears to be otherwise incomplete in some 
respects." Badger, 922 P.2d at 751-52. 
8
 This case is thus squarely distinguishable from S&G Inc. v. Morgan, 797 P.2d 1085, 1088 
(Utah 1990), where the Supreme Court held that a plaintiffs purposeful failure to appear before 
the State Engineer in an administrative proceeding precluded him from raising any claims on de 
novo review before the district court. The S&G court held that "persons aggrieved by decisions 
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B. What Process is Due9 
"[S]tate action affecting property must generally be accompanied by notification of that 
action." Tulsa Professional Collection Serv., Inc. v. Pope. 485 U.S. 478, 484 (1988). It is a 
fundamental requirement of due process that the "notice [be] reasonably calculated, under all the 
circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an 
opportunity to present their objections." Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 
306, 314 (1950).,0 Since "[t]his right to be heard has little reality or worth unless one is 
informed that the matter is pending and can choose for himself whether to appear or default, 
acquiesce or contest." the form of notice chosen "must be such as one desirous of actually 
informing [the interested party] might reasonably adopt to accomplish it." Id "The 
reasonableness and hence the constitutional validity of any chosen method may be defended on 
of administrative agencies 'may not, by refusing or neglecting to submit issues of fact to such 
agencies, by-pass them, and call upon the courts to determine . . . matters properly determinable 
originally by such agencies.' " IcL at 1087 (quoting People v. Keith Ry. Equip. Co., 161 P.2d 
244, 249 (1945)). This is not a case where Mr. Longley refused or neglected to protest. 
Rather, this is a case where Mr. Longley did not participate because the State failed in its 
constitutional duty to adequately inform Mr. Longley of the proceeding. 
9
 It should be noted at the onset that what process is due is "a matter of federal law" and 
is "not diminished by the fact that the State may have specified its own procedures that it may 
deem adequate for determining the preconditions to adverse [state] action." Vitek v. Jones, 445 
U.S. 480, 491 (1980). Thus, whether the State Engineer complied with Utah's statutory 
requirements is irrelevant for purposes of federal constitutional analysis. Assuming, arguendo, 
the notice in this case complied with statutory requirements this court must independently 
analyze whether the notice was constitutionally adequate. IcL See also LoudermilL 470 U.S. 
at 541. 
10
 The standard enunciated in Mullane is the same standard Utah courts have applied to 
determine whether notice is adequate under article I, section 7, of the Utah Constitution, the 
language of which is identical to the federal constitution. See Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 
1207, 1212 (Utah 1983) (quoting Mullane standard); State v. Rawlings, 893 P.2d 1063, 1069 
(Utah Ct. App. 1995) (same). Accordingly, the arguments in this section apply to both the state 
and federal constitutional claims of Mr. Longley. 
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the ground that it is in itself reasonably certain to inform those affected." Id. However, "[i]t 
would be idle to pretend that publication alone . . . is a reliable means of acquainting interested 
parties of the fact that their rights are before the courts" since "[c]hance alone brings to the 
attention of . . . a local resident an advertisement in small type inserted in the back pages of a 
newspaper." IcL In short "process which is a mere gesture is not due process." IdL Therefore, 
notice by publication is generally disfavored. New York v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co.. 344 
U.S. 293, 296 (1953) ("Notice by publication is a poor and sometimes a hopeless substitute for 
actual service of notice. Its justification is difficult at best."). 
Appellees thus cannot hide behind the long ago disregarded notion that notice by 
newspaper is generally constitutionally adequate. Instead, the "reasonably calculated" standard 
of Mullane makes due process analysis a flexible, case-by-case inquiry which requires that notice 
and the opportunity to be heard are "appropriate to the nature of the case." Mullane, 339 U.S. 
at 313. As the Utah Supreme Court has noted, " 'due process' is not a technical concept with 
a fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances which can be imprisoned within the 
treacherous limits of any formula." Rupp v. Grantsville City. 610 P.2d 338, 341 (Utah 1980); 
Worthen. 926 P.2d at 876. Rather, to determine the appropriateness or reasonableness of notice, 
the Court usually balances the individual interests alleged to be adversely affected against the 
government interests sought to be advanced by its procedures or actions. See, e.g.. Tulsa, 485 
U.S. at 489-490; Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill. 470 U.S. 532, 543-44 (1985); Mathews 
v. Eldridge. 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976); Zimmerman Brush. 455 U.S. at 430 n.5 ("having made 
access to the courts ... a necessity, the State may not deprive someone of that access unless the 
balance of state and private interests favors the government scheme"); Anderson v. Public Service 
Commission. 839 P.2d 822, 825 (Utah 1992) ("To determine whether the agency has acted 
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reasonably in choosing a method of notice, we balance the interest sought to be protected against 
the interest of the agency.").N 
Thus while cases have held that when state action affects "all persons in the state claiming 
a right to water" publication of notice by newspaper is likely adequate. See In re Chumstick 
Creek Drainage Basin, 694 P.2d at 1069. However, when state action affects relatively few 
foreseeable individuals or entities, whose names and addresses are known or reasonably 
ascertainable, publication only by newspaper is clearly inadequate. For example, in Mennonite 
Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791, 800 (1983), the United States Supreme Court held that 
"actual notice is a minimum constitutional precondition to a proceeding which will adversely 
affect the liberty or property interests of any party, whether unlettered or well versed in 
commercial practice, if its name and address are reasonably ascertainable." See also Department 
of Ecology v. Acquavella, 674 P.2d 160, 163, 165 (Wash. 1983) (noting that "[i]f a moderate 
number of water users was involved . . . we might find notice by mail or personal service was 
required" and that "an adjudication of a smaller scale . . . might require sen ice of process upon 
all individual water users who receive their water from distributing entities"). Additionally, even 
when a state action or proceeding affects relatively large numbers of individuals, individual 
service of process may still be required if the proceeding is sure to affect the rights of those 
individuals. Cf, e ^ , Rupp v. Grantsville Citv. 610 P.2d 338 (Utah 1980) (entire city notified 
by mail): Department of Ecology v. Acquavella, 674 P.2d 160, 162 (Wash. 1983) (serving 4,289 
11
 However, it should be noted that "the cost of protecting a constitutional right cannot 
justify its total denial," Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977), and "procedural due process is 
not intended to promote efficiency," Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 90 n.22 (1972). To the 
contrary, the due process clause was "designed to protect the fragile values of a vulnerable 
citizenry from the overbearing concern for efficiency ... that may characterize praiseworthy 
government officials." Stanley v. Illinois. 405 U.S. 645, 656 (1972). 
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defendants individually in a general adjudication of water rights). Finally, when the whereabouts 
of an interested party is known even notice by certified mail is constitutionally inadequate if not 
reasonably calculated to apprise that party of the pending proceeding. See Robinson v. Hanrahan, 
409 U.S. 38 (1972) (holding notice by certified mail of automobile forfeiture proceedings 
inadequate where state knew owner was in jail). 
In considering the balance of interests, it is impermissible for this Court to consider 
actions that Mr. Longley could have taken to apprise himself of the subject proceedings since "a 
party's ability to take steps to safeguard its interests does not relieve the State of its constitutional 
obligation" to provide adequate notice. Mennonite Bd. of Missions, 462 U.S. at 799. Nor can 
the fact that other parties received notice of the subject proceedings be imputed to Mr. Longley 
and relieve the State of its constitutional burden since due process analysis is a peculiarly 
individualized inquiry. For example, "particularly extensive efforts to provide notice may often 
be required when the State is aware of a party's inexperience." Id. 
It is clear, from the foregoing principles and precedents that the notice by publication 
utilized in this case, (R. 61, 290), was not constitutionally appropriate under the facts and 
circumstances. This is true because the State Engineer's July 10, 1992 Memorandum Decision 
lapsing the Change Application (R. 49-50), and the automatic denial of the Request for 
Reconsideration of that decision (R. 164), triggered a greater duty on the part of the State 
Engineer to countermand, through adequate notice, the practical effect of these decisions; 
particularly where Mr. Longley requested individual actual notice (R. 330-31, 353-54, 365, 515. 
530, 556-57. 562-63. 565-67) which would not be unduly burdensome to provide in this case; 
and because the proffered notice itself, (R. 61, 290), was too vague and uncertain to apprise Mr. 
Longley that his rights would be affected. 
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/. More notice than mere publication was required to countermand the effects 
of the State Engineer's prior July 10. 1992 Memorandum Decision. 
By virtue of the State Engineer's July 10, 1992 Memorandum Decision, the subject 
Change Application lapsed. The Change Application, originally filed in 1970, was extended via 
four separate Extension Requests. (R. 161-62, 271-72.) The fourth Extension Request, granted 
in 1985, was granted with the express condition that it would be the last extension and set 
November 30, 1989, as the absolute final deadline for filing the required proof. (R. 40, 162; Ex. 
A.) The State Engineer warned Leucadia that if proof was not filed by Nov. 30, 1989, the 
Change Application would lapse. (R. 40; Ex. A.) On Nov. 30, 1989, Leucadia filed a false and 
unsigned Proof of Permanent Change. (R. 163) Thus, after a field inspection where the State 
Engineer found that the facilities identified in the Proof did not exist, the State Engineer declared 
the Change Application to be lapsed in its July 10, 1992 Memorandum Decision. (R. 49-50.) 
The State Engineer made this declaration even though Leucadia had filed a fifth Extension 
Request in 1990, ten months after the November 30, 1989, deadline. (R. 49-50, 327-28.) Of 
course, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-13, Leucadia filed a request for reconsideration of 
the July 10, 1992 order lapsing the Change Application. (R. 52, 164.) But the State Engineer 
did not timely act on that request (R. 164) and by virtue of § 63-46b-13(3)(b) the request was 
therefore denied.12 
For all intents and purposes then, the public record at the State Engineer's Office, of 
which Mr. Longley had learned, told the world that the issue was dead. (R. 352-55.) Obviously, 
12
 Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-l3(3)(b) states: "If the agency . . . does not issue an order 
within 20 days after the filing of the request, the request for reconsideration shall be considered 
to be denied." Cf Judkins v. Fronk, 120 Utah 359, 234 P.2d 849 (1951) (conditional permit 
void by its own terms when those conditions failed to occur). 
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it would be reasonable for the general public, including Mr. Longley, to rely upon those records. 
Accordingly, the degree to which the State Engineer could expect the public to peruse the 
newspapers for notification of action on this matter—a matter thought to be dead—was severely 
diminished, if not completely obliterated by the July 10, 1992 Decision. Thus the strong 
presumption that publication by notice is ineffective, as expressed in Mullane and its progeny, 
becomes even stronger when a state has taken previous action that would discourage interested 
parties from actively seeking out the published notice. (R. 352-55.) This fact cannot be ignored 
since the adequacy of notice is viewed under the totality of circumstances of each case. Rupp, 
610 P.2d at 341. As the form of notice chosen "must be such as one desirous of actually 
informing [the interested parties] might reasonably adopt to accomplish it," Mullane, 339 U.S. 
at 314, the State Engineer was required to take more than the usual step of mere publication to 
countermand the effect of his July 1992 Memorandum Decision. At the very least, if the State 
Engineer was desirous of actually informing interested parties he should have mailed notice to 
those individuals actually known to be interested in the proceedings. 
2. More notice than publication was required because Mr. Longley requested 
actual notice and his name and address were known. 
Although Mr. Longley had requested actual notice. (R. 330-31, 353-54, 365, 515, 530, 
556-57, 562-63, 565-67) and provided the State Engineer with his name and address, the State 
Engineer nonetheless brushed that request aside pretending that the small print in the back pages 
of a newspaper would provide the constitutionally mandated notice. As the Supreme Court of 
South Dakota recognized in In re Application of Union Carbide Corp., 308 N.W.2d 753 (S.D. 
1981), the director of a state agency abuses his discretion when he opts to give minimum public 
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notice of proceedings which results in an untimely protest when that director or the agency in his 
charge knows of a potential protestanf s interest in the proceeding. This blatant disregard for Mr. 
Longley's rights demonstrates that the means chosen by the State Engineer were not those of "one 
desirous of actually informing [the interested parties]" as required by the Constitution. Mullane, 
339 U.S. at 314. Instead, the State Engineer-and, subsequently, the trial court-blatantly rode 
roughshod over Mr. Longley's constitutional rights. 
Mr. Longley did not then, nor does he now, request of the State Engineer the impossible 
or impracticable. As the Supreme Court stated in Mullane, M[a] construction of the Due Process 
Clause uhich would place impossible or impractical obstacles in the way could not be justified." 
Mullane, 339 U.S. at 313-14. Mr. Longley did not ask, and is not asking now, that the State 
Engineer personally notify "all ultimate water users in [a] basin" any time their interests may be 
adversely affected by a proceeding as this "would be an impractical obstacle." Department of 
Ecolouv v. Acquavella, 674 P.2d 160, 163 (Wash. 1983). Mr. Longley simply asked, and 
continues to ask, that the State Engineer and this Court recognize that which is clearly required, 
at a bare minimum, by the United States Constitution: that those who request specific notice of 
a specific action, and provide their name and address, become a reasonably identifiable class of 
persons and therefore must receive actual notice. Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 
791, 800 (1983). "[A]ctual notice is a minimum constitutional precondition to a proceeding which 
will adversely affect the liberty or property interests of any party . . . if its name and address are 
reasonably ascertainable." IcL (emphasis added). 
Providing notice to those who actually request it is not an onerous burden. In fact, even 
states more populous than Utah, such as Colorado, impose statutory requirements that the state 
give notice of changes or applications affecting water rights to those it "has reason to believe 
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would be affected or who [have] requested the same by submitting his name and address to the 
water clerk." Colo. Rev. Stat. § 37-92-302(3)(b), (c) (1990); Save Our Dunes v. Alabama Dept. 
of Envtl. Management 834 F.2d 984, 989-90 (11th Cir. 1987) (noting state agency's practice to 
notify "anyone who specifically requests to receive direct written notice of final agency action 
as to a specific application" and that this practice satisfied constitutional mandates); Jones v. 
District of Columbia. 323 F.2d 306, 308 (D.C. 1963) (noting that government mailed notice to 
300 organizations that had requested it). Cfi In re Silicone Gel Breast Implant Prod. Liab. Litig., 
1994 W.L. 114580 (N.D. Ala. 1994) (approving class action notice plan that provided, in part, 
a nationwide toll-free information line to provide notice to those who request it). Other Utah 
administrative agencies who have similar kinds of hearings, including those within the same 
Department as the State Engineer such as the Division of Oil, Gas & Mining, make it a practice 
to provide actual notice to those who request it. l j If the burden of providing notice to those 
13
 See e.g.: Utah Admin. Code R315-3-21(d)(2) (If no modification of the second phase of 
a plan approval for land treatment demonstrations is necessary, the Department of Environmental 
Quality will give notice of a final decision "to each person who requested notice of final decision 
on the second phase of the plan approval."); Utah Admin. Code R317-8-611(1) (After the close 
of the public comment period under the permit process for a UPDES permit, the Division of 
Water Quality must notify each person who has requested notice of that decision.); Utah Admin. 
Code R317-8-8.8(6) (Where submission requesting POTW pretreatment program approval does 
not comply with proper requirements, the Division of Water Quality will provide notice in 
writing to each person who has requested individual notice.); Utah Admin. Code R317-8-8-8.9(3) 
(In approving or denying requests for approval of POTW pretreatment programs and applications 
for removal credit authorization, the Division of Water Quality must notify each person who has 
requested individual notice of his decision.); Utah Admin. Code R645-301-800-830.421 (In filing 
and maintaining bonds and insurance for coal mining and reclamation operations, the Division 
of Oil, Gas and Mining must "[njotify any person with a property interest in collateral who has 
requested notification of any proposed adjustment to the bond amount ... ."); Utah Admin. Code 
R645-301-800-880.220 (The Division of Oil, Gas and Mining must notify those persons with an 
interest in bond collateral who have requested notice, of its decision regarding all or part of a 
performance bond.): Utah Admin. Code R649-3-1-15.3.3 (The Division of Oil, Gas and Mining 
must notify those persons with an interest in bond collateral who requested notice, of its decision 
to release or not release a bond.); Utah Admin. Code R652-90-600(3) (Upon completion of site-
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who request it is not too onerous for more populous states and other Utah agencies, it is difficult 
to see why it is too onerous for the State Engineer.14 
However, this Court need not decide that every party with a property interest at stake 
who requests notice is constitutionally entitled to receive it. Rather this Court can and should 
reach an even narrower holding because there is no indication in the record that anyone but Mr. 
Longley asked the State Engineer for individual notice. (See R. 330-31, 353-54, 365, 515. 530, 
556-57, 562-63, 565-67.) If the record indicated that dozens or hundreds of people had requested 
notice of the subject applications, it might not be practicable to require as a general rule that the 
State Engineer provide individualized notice to that many people. See Dodson v. Parham, 427 
F. Supp. 97 (N.D. Ga. 1977). However, the record in this case indicates that only Mr. Longley 
requested such notice. It is therefore difficult to see how the cost of one sheet of paper, one 
envelope, and one stamp can outweigh Mr. Longley"s constitutional right to receive adequate 
notice under the circumstances of this case.13 
specific planning, the Di\ision of Forestry, Fire and State Lands must provide those persons 
requesting notice, a summary of the final division action.); Utah Admin. Code R746-405-2(D)(7) 
(When a utility makes a tariff filing with the Public Service Commission, the utility must provide 
to interested parties which requested information, a copy of the advice letter and copies of each 
related tariff sheet.); Utah Admin. Code R850-100-300( 1 )(b)(ii) (The School and Institutional 
Trust Lands Administration, in providing for public input into the development of the statewide 
management plan, must notify any parties who have requested notice, prior to conducting public 
meetings.). 
14
 Even the trial court in this case recognized at oral argument that all the State Engineer's 
Office would "have to do is put it in the computer's database, touch the button and it will print 
out the notices for everybody and they'll have the hearing." (R. at 566.) 
15
 Therefore Appellees' inevitable "floodgate" argument is a rather hollow and desperate 
attempt to stamp out Mr. Longley's constitutional rights and to present this Court with broader 
issues not properly before it. There should be no concern with holding notice is required for 
the one individual who requested it in this case, since the narrow issue before this court does 
not mandate a holding that it will always be a requirement to provide notice to anyone who 
requests it in any case. That is not the issue before this court. 
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Even assuming, arguendo, that the cost of one sheet of paper, one envelope, and one 
stamp is an onerous burden, the state could ha\e easily remedied that burden by requiring those 
who request such notice to pay a reasonable fee. For example, Louisiana requires that notice be 
given when requested but imposes a ten dollar fee for doing so in order "to defray the cost of 
providing the notice." Mid-State Homes. Inc. v. Portis, 652 F. Supp. 640. 642 n.3 (W.D. La. 
1987) (citing La. Rev. Stat. 13:3886); La. Rev. Stat. 13:3886(B)(1) (1997). In fact, the United 
States Supreme Court acknowledged a similar Indiana statute in Mennonite Bd. of Missions that 
provides for notice by certified mail if the interested party "has annually requested such notice 
and has agreed to pay a fee, not to exceed $10, to cover the cost of sending notice." Mennonite 
Bd. of Missions, 462 U.S. at 793 n.2. Therefore, the cost of notifying Mr. Longley did not even 
have to be that of one sheet of paper, one envelope, and one stamp as these "onerous" costs could 
have been defrayed by requiring Mr. Longley to pay for them. 
3. The published notice itself was constitutionally defective. 
In this case the trial court found that the "State Engineer's notice of publication of 
Leucadia's Extension Request was sufficient to comply with Utah law." (R. 536), but apparently 
made-or attempted to make-no decision with respect to the adequacy of notice for purposes of 
the federal and state constitutions. Indeed, in announcing his decision from the bench, the trial 
judge stated: 
[IJf there is any substance in this area of the law that appears to be clear, it is the 
requirement for notice to parties. However, courts are uncomfortable, as you 
might well suspect, in—at the trial level-creating or enunciating constitutional 
rights. I think as a trial court I am bound by the statutes. I am bound by the 
administrative procedures and the portions of the administrative code of the State 
of Utah in making my decisions. Should the Supreme Court decide that the scope 
of my work should be greater, that's the Supreme Court's decision and this trial 
judge's. Accordingly, the Motion for Summary Judgment is granted. It is clear 
to the Court that this was an untimely protest, outside the 30 days. That is not in 
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dispute. And while I am concerned about notice requirements and the 
constitutional basis for notice requirements, a higher court than this one will have 
to make that decision. 
(R. 574.) The court's written order made no reference to the constitutional adequacy of notice. 
(R. 534-38.) However, in granting the motion the trial court ruled, sub silentio, that the notice 
was constitutionally adequate, a decision this Court should accord no deference; a decision this 
court should reverse. 
The published notice in this case is constitutionally inadequate because the legal 
description for diversion point numbers (1) and (4) therein have no reference to any monument 
or corner but merely recite courses and distances, (R. 290; Ex. I), which have long been 
recognized "to be among the most unreliable calls." 12 Am. Jur. 2d Boundaries § 73 (1964). 
There is also no reference to a land Section number for diversion point numbers (1), (3), (4) and 
(5). (R. 290; Ex. I.) And only diversion point number (6) references a township and range. (R. 
290; Ex. I.) Furthermore, a baseline reference is not identified for any of the diversion points. 
(R. 290; Ex. I.) Of course. Appellees conveniently attribute Section 25 diversion points to (1) 
and (2) and Section 26 to diversion points (3)-to-(5). (R. 513-14.) However, such attribution 
is not at all intuitive given the punctuation—or lack thereof—utilized in the notice. (R. 290; Ex. 
I.) If Section 25 is to be properly attributed to diversion point (1) then a semi-colon should have 
been inserted after "Section 25" and before "(3)" to indicate that Section 25 belonged to that 
phrase or sentence.16 Otherwise, the newspaper description reads as one incoherent run-on 
16
 The diversion points were listed as follows: 
(1) S 50 W2531 , 
(2) S 2343 E 253 from NW Cor, Sec 25, 
(3) S 50 E 50 from NW Cor, 
(4) S 50 W 66, 
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sentence with no indication of which Sections should be attributed to which courses and 
distances. When viewing the notice, a member of the public could have thought that diversion 
point (1) was in Section 26 or e\en another Section that was omitted, perhaps, by error. Since 
a Section is approximately 640 square acres or 1 square mile, Olin L. Browder et aL Basic 
Property Law 765 (5th ed. 1989), it is not unreasonable to request a more precise description of 
where a 16 inch well might be placed within one of two Sections. 
In Eldorado at Santa Fe, Inc. v. Cook, 822 P.2d 672 (N.M. Ct. App. 1991), the New 
Mexico Court of Appeals faced a case nearly identical to this case. In Eldorado, the New Mexico 
State Engineer published notice of a water well change application, received no protests 
thereunder, and issued a permit to change the location of a well. Id, at 674. There were no 
protests to the change application, presumably because the published notice included an improper 
land grant description. Id, During construction of the new well, several parties moved the state 
engineer to set aside the change permit because of the defective notice. Id, The state engineer 
denied the motion for lack of jurisdiction. Id. Several years later the movants sought a writ of 
certiorari, apparently requiring remand for republication of notice and reconsideration, h i The 
New Mexico Court of Appeals granted that writ, reasoning that the protestants, like Mr. Longley 
in this case, had lost their right to appeal the state engineer's decision "[d]ue to the error in the 
publication notice." Id, at 675. Because the published notice did not adequately describe the 
location of the well the protestants, like Mr. Longley in this case, "failed to receive notice of the 
application" for the change, id. The court reasoned that its decision was "mandated by 
constitutional due process requirements" and rejected the same technical argument Appellees 
(5) S 2343 W 50 from NE Cor, 
(6) S 2343 E 297 from NW Cor, Sec 25, T42S, R14W. 
>xson i OSS9 i -30-
assert in this case: "that petitioners were not a party to the state engineer's proceedings" and 
therefore had no standing to protest the change application after the passing of the appropriate 
cut off date. kL The court affirmed a district court determination that the state engineer lacked 
jurisdiction to grant the change application and "remanded the case for new rather than additional 
proceedings," the very result Mr. Longley seeks in this case.17 
In this case, the incomplete legal description in the published notice renders the 
description uncertain. Obviously, the pennies it would cost to add Section. Range, and Township 
numbers to each course and distance would result in a description substantially more likely to 
notify interested parties.18 A discrepancy in a township is a thirty-six-square-mile discrepancy. 
Basic Property Law 763. A discrepancy in a Section is a 640-acre discrepancy. IcL at 765. 
When the location of a 16-inch well is disputed, that is a huge discrepancy, particularly when the 
17
 IcL at 676 (emphasis added). At any rate, though it should do so, this Court need 
not decide that the notice as published in this case was constitutionally deficient on its face. 
Rather, since the "reasonableness and hence the constitutional validity of any chosen method may 
be defended on the ground that ... the form chosen is not substantially less likely to bring home 
notice than other of the feasible and customary substitutes," Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314. the 
notice actually published in this case is constitutionally defective if there was another "feasible 
and customary" means of providing notice substantially more likely to give adequate notice. 
Appellees have already conceded that there is a more adequate means of giving notice by virtue 
of their chart on page 4 of their REPLY MEMORANDUM (MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT), (R. 510, 513), which conveniently attributes to the course and distance calls 
Section numbers, Ranges, and Townships, (R. 513), items which they managed to attach to 
courses and distances in other, much longer and more costly, published notices. (See, e.g., R. 
367 (Ex. D to Mr. Longley's MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT 
LEUCADIA'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT).) 
13
 As the trial court recognized at oral argument on the motion for summary judgment: 
Well, Counsel, there was a publication that occurred in April of 1994, and the 
publication was somewhat cryptic as to the description of the wells, I will grant 
you that. // could have been done better and printer's ink is a whole lot cheaper 
than litigation, as all the parties well know. 
(R. at 564.) 
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New Mexico Court of Appeals seems to suggest that an error in identifying the proper Section 
is a "substanthe error." Eldorado, 822 P.2d at 674. The error-filled notice was therefore 
constitutionally infirm as discussed above. The notice was statutorily inadequate for the 
additional reasons outlined in Part II below and incorporated herein by reference. 
C. Mr. Longley Was Denied Due Process of Law. 
A trial court's determination of the constitutional adequacy of notice is never given 
deference since the adequacy of notice is a question of law. Patrick v. Rice, 814 P.2d 463, 467 
(N.M. Ct. App. 1991), cert, denied, 815 P.2d 161 (N.M. 1991). Indeed whether proper notice 
has been given is not a question of fact but is a question of law where the determination depends 
on the interpretation of the written content of the published notice. New Pueblo Const., Inc. v. 
State of Arizona, 696 P.2d 203, 211 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984), vacated on other grounds, 696 P.2d 
185 (Ariz. 1985). "It is axiomatic that the order of an administrative body issued without notice 
to affected individuals is violative of due process." Wagner v. Salt Lake City, 29 Utah 2d 42, 
504 P.2d 1007, 1013 (1972) (citing Morris v. Public Service Commission, 7 Utah 2d 167, 321 
P.2d 644 (1958)). Likewise, as the foregoing discussion demonstrates, it is axiomatic that action 
taken by an administrative body without notice to affected individuals is violative of due process. 
Denying Mr. Longley the opportunity to protest under the circumstances of this case is simply 
unfair. The core goal of due process is fairness. See Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207, 1211 
(Utah 1983). This has been recognized by courts of this jurisdiction since before statehood. 
Commenting upon the meaning of the phrase "due process of law" Justice Judd, writing for the 
Utah Supreme Court more than 100 years ago, stated, "Many definitions have been attempted, 
but it is believed that they all come to this citation, which means that a party shall have his da\ 
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in court." Jensen v. Union Pacific Rv. Co., 21 P. 994, 995 (Utah 1889). This Court should 
therefore reverse the decision of the trial court and give Mr. Longley his day in court. 
II. THE NOTICE OF THE FIFTH EXTENSION REQUEST DID NOT COMPORT 
WITH STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS AND WAS THEREFORE STATUTORILY 
DEFECTIVE. 
The aforementioned constitutional difficulties can be avoided by proper interpretation of 
Utah statutes requiring notice be given to water users. This Court "[has] a duty to construe 
statutes to avoid constitutional conflicts," Provo City Corp. v. State, 795 P.2d 1120, 1125 (Utah 
1990), and "to avoid constitutional infirmities whenever possible." State v. Lindquist, 674 P.2d 
1234, 1237 (Utah 1983). If the statutes in question only require the notice that was actually 
given in this case then those statutes would clearly be unconstitutional as applied. However, this 
Court is "constrained to construe statutory terms to avoid an unconstitutional application of [a] 
statute" whenever possible. Utah State Road Commission v. Friberg, 687 P.2d 821, 831 (Utah 
1984). A construction of the relevant notice statutes in this case that would avoid constitutional 
difficulties is possible under this Court's and the Utah Supreme Court's prior precedents requiring 
notice statutes be strictly construed to require adequate notice to parties with affected property 
interests. 
A. Strict Compliance With the Notice Statute Is Required. 
This Court has held that strict statutory compliance is required whenever failure to adhere 
to statutory requirements will affect the substantive rights of a party. See Badger v. Madsen, 896 
P.2d 20. 23 (Utah Ct. App. 1995), cert, denied, 910 P.2d 425 (Utah 1996); W&G Co. v. 
Redevelopment Aizencv, 802 P.2d 755, 760-61 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). If full protection under 
the relevant statute would not be enjoyed by the party the statute seeks to protect, then substantial 
compliance with that statute is wholly inadequate and strict compliance will be required. UL 
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Obviously the relevant notice statute at bar, Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-12(l)(e), was designed to 
protect the public and other water users from unwarranted and unnotified deprivations of their 
property interests. And, as Part LA. supra illustrates, Mr. Longley will not be able to enjoy full 
protection of those rights absent strict compliance. Just as "[a] shareholder who has voting rights 
but is not put on [adequate] notice . . . of a meeting . . . may decide that his or her presence at 
the meeting is not important," Madsen, 896 P.2d at 23, Mr. Longley, who has water rights but 
is not put on adequate notice of a proceeding, may decide that his presence at the proceeding is 
not important. (Cf. R. 352-55.) And just as "the shareholder's substantive rights may well be 
irrevocably prejudiced" by the corporation's selling of its property and assets. Id., Mr. Longley's 
substantive rights may well be irrevocably prejudiced by the State Engineer's approval of the 
subject extension. (R. 157-176.) Strict compliance with § 73-3-12(l)(e) is therefore obviously 
required.19 
Furthermore, Utah courts have required strict construction of notice statutes or statutes 
affecting interests in property for the very purpose of avoiding constitutional due process 
problems. For example, in W&G Co. v. Redevelopment Agency, 802 P.2d 755, 760-61, (Utah 
Ct. App. 1990), this Court avoided reaching the merits of the constitutional question decided at 
the trial court by strictly construing notice provisions of the Utah Neighborhood Development 
Act, Utah Code Ann. § 11-19-1 et seq., to require detailed notice of the impending governmental 
action. See id. at 761-63 (recognizing the requirements of due process but deciding the case 
based upon an interpretation of the statute). This Court appropriately held that where statutory 
19
 Substantial compliance with the statute is inadequate because of the constitutional 
dimensions of this case. Also the policy of the statute-to give notice to water users in a manner 
that comports with due process-can only be satisfied through strict compliance. See Part I, 
supra; Madsen, 896 P.2d at 23. 
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notice requirements are not met, the underlying "proceedings are void and those not properly 
notified are not bound by the proceedings because the giving of such notice is jurisdictional." 
Id at 765 (citing Salt Lake County v. Murray City Redevelopment, 598 P,2d 1339, 1344 (Utah 
1979); Cate v. Archon Oil Co., 695 P.2d 1352, 1356 (Okla. 1985)). Accord, Madsen. 896 P.2d 
at 23-24. 
Accordingly, the statute of limitations in that case, which required that any interested 
person affected by the redevelopment plan protest it within 30 days after enactment or forever 
be barred from contesting its validity, was never triggered. W&G Co., 802 P.2d at 761 & n.4, 
765. The statute of limitations in that case is indistinguishable from Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-7(1) 
(1989), which provides, in pertinent part that "[a]ny person interested may, at any time within 
30 days after notice is published, file a protest with the state engineer." Like the plaintiff in 
W&G, who missed the statutory 30-day cut-off period by nearly 10 years, Mr. Longley missed 
by approximately 10 months, (R. 276-78), the 30-day cut off under § 73-3-7(1) that Defendants 
and the trial court relied upon to deny Mr. Longley standing. (R. 276-78; 534-38.) Therefore, 
if the notice triggering the 30-day statute of limitations, then the approval of extensions and the 
denial of Mr. Longley's right to protest are void with respect to Mr. Longley. W&G, 802 P.2d 
at 765. As the following discussion illustrates, the notice Mr. Longley received was clearlv 
defective. 
B. The Published Notice Did Not Strictly Comply With Statutory Requirements. 
Leucadia acknowledges that extension applications must be published in compliance with 
§ 73-3-12(l)(e), which requires: 
(i) The state engineer shall publish notice once each week for three consecutive weeks 
in a newspaper of general circulation in the county in which the source of supply 
is located. 
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(ii) The notice shall contain information that will inform the public of the diligence 
claimed and the reason for the request. 
(emphasis added.) (R. 510-22.) In granting summary judgment, the trial court held, "The State 
Engineer's notice of publication of Leucadia's Extension Request was sufficient to comply with 
Utah law." (R. at 536.) Yet, a review of that notice reveals that it was blatantly insufficient in 
light of the requirements of the statute, which must be strictly complied with in the circumstances 
of this case. Leucadia claimed that the notice of the fifth Extension Request published in 
February and April of 1994 was adequate primarily because it was published three times in 
February and three times in April. (R. 273; 280-81.) The statute specifically requires in addition 
to the number of times notice is to be published that the notice contain information to inform the 
public of the diligence claimed and the reason for the request. The published notice at bar 
contained neither. Additionally, the notice itself was ambiguous and confusing. 
/. The April published notice did not inform the public of the diligence 
claimed. 
As mentioned, § 73-3-12(l)(e)(ii) requires all published notices not just to "contain 
information . . . of the diligence claimed" but to "contain information that will inform the public 
of the diligence claimed." Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-12(l)(e)(ii) (emphasis added). See also Carlie 
v. Morgan, 922 P.2d 1 (Utah 1996) (court must assume that each term in statute was used 
advisedly). Section 73-3-12 casts "diligence" in terms of actual work done to complete an 
appropriation. Therefore, a claim of diligence requires evidence of "construction of the works 
and the application of water to beneficial use." Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-12(l)(a). And the 
applicant must "affirmatively show that he has exercised or is exercising reasonable and due 
diligence in working towards completion of the appropriation" of water before an extension o'i 
time can be granted. Utah Code Ann. sj 73-3-12(l)(g). For example, Leucadia's 1979 notice for 
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the third Extension Request gave the statutorily required notice of due diligence by stating that 
"three test holes have been enlarged and drilled [and] [approximately $100,000 has been 
expended to date" on constructing the facilities. (R. 372.) 
In this case, however, Leucadia disingenuously refers to the addition of six "new" wells 
as the requisite evidence of due diligence. (R. 290.) But those six "new" wells are the same six 
proposed wells that were the subject of the original underlying 1970 Change Application. (R. 
at 340.) It is therefore patently insufficient and circular logic to assert that the proposing of six 
"new" wells mentioned in the April 1994 notice will act as evidence of due diligence in 
constructing the wells and putting the water to beneficial use. The notice at issue does not say 
that six new wells had been installed, that test pumping was under way, or that any other 
activities had occurred. The notice merely recites the locations of the six "new" proposed wells, 
the same as was done in the notice of the Change Application some 24 years earlier. (R. 340.) 
In short, Appellees assert that merely mentioning & proposal for "new" wells—the same proposal 
for new wells first introduced in a Change Application nearly a quarter century ago—is sufficient 
to inform the public of Appellees' diligence. However, statements of actions that are clearly not 
adequate to constitute diligence are certainly not sufficient to inform the public of the diligence 
claimed. The notice of fifth Extension Request is devoid of any reference to the due diligence 
of Leucadia. contrary to the express requirement of § 78-3-12(l)(e)(ii). The notice is therefore 
statutorily deficient and the trial court's ruling must be reversed. 
2. The April published notice did not inform the public of the reason for the 
request. 
Utah law also requires that the notice published for an Extension Request inform the 
public of the reason for the delay. Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-12(l)(e)(ii). The notice published 
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in this case provides no information whatsoever explaining any reason for the delay. (R. 290; 
Ex. I.) In the court below, Leucadia claimed that the boiler-plate introductory language at the 
top of every notice provides the statutorily required reason for the request, i.e., "that additional 
time is needed to place the water to beneficial use." (R. 512-14.) However, this merely states 
the obvious and impermissibly renders § 73-3-12(l)(e)(ii) a nullity and an absurdity. See Millett 
v. Clark Clinic Corp., 609 P.2d 934 (Utah 1980) (court should avoid interpretations rendering a 
provision nonsensical or absurd). The application form for such a request is entitled 
"[Amplication requesting an extension of time within which to submit proof of beneficial use." 
(See R. 341, 508.) Leucadia seeks to have this Court hold that a notice gives the required 
"reason for the request," when it states "the applicant needs an extension of time within which 
to submit proof of beneficial use." | 
The primary rule of statutory interpretation is to give effect to the intent of the legislature 
in light of the purpose the statute was meant to achieve. Beaver County v. Utah State Tax 
Commission, 916 P.2d 344, 358 (Utah 1996). From its plain language, the obvious purpose of 
§ 73-3-12( l)(e)(ii) is to require more than a conclusory assertion that a party seeking an extension 
needs more time. Instead, the plain language of § 73-3-12(l)(e)(ii) requires the published notice 
to contain a short statement informing the public of the grounds or the reason more time is 
I 
needed. Otherwise, an interested person would not know whether it is worth the time or effort 
to file a protest, or if he had grounds to file a protest. Absent a short justification for delay in 
the published notice, an interested water user may assume that he has no grounds to protest and 
"decide that his or her presence at the [proceeding] is not important," Madsen, 896 P.2d at 23, 
or that the cost and expense of filing a protest are not justified. Conversely, to construe the 
statute as Leucadia suggests might encourage every water user in a region to protest every 
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application because from the notice given in the newspaper those potential protestants could not 
even vaguely discern whether there were legitimate grounds for the Extension Request. 
Therefore, Leucadia's proffered reading creates the incentive to file frivolous protests "just in 
case" there are no grounds for the extensions sought. Such a reading clearly defeats the general 
purposes of fair and efficient water administration embodied in Utah's water law statutes. 
Leucadia* s claim that "the reason for the request" requirement referenced in the statute 
is satisfied by a statement that more time is needed simply begs the question and renders the 
express statutory requirement for notice of the reason for the request meaningless. Since a court 
should not presume that a legislative body used language idly and with no intent that meaning 
should be given to its language, Colorado Ground Water Comm'n v. Eagle Peak Frams, Ltd.. 919 
P.2d 212, 218 (Colo. 1996), this court should interpret "reason", as used in § 73-3-12(l)(e) to 
require a brief justification or explanation of why the applicant needs more time. To do so 
avoids an absurdity not intended by the legislature, effectuates the plain language and obvious 
purpose of the statute, and gives meaning to text that Leucadia would render meaningless. 
Furthermore, comparison of the April 1994 notice with an earlier notice, i.e., the 1982 
notice on the fourth Extension Request, reveals that strict compliance with the notice statute is 
not unduly burdensome or impracticable. The 1982 notice states the reason for the extension v\as 
that Leucadia was in bankruptcy and was working out a reorganization. (R. 341, 369-70.) When 
§ 73-3-12(l)(j), which speaks in terms of justified or unjustified delay and requires that an 
applicant have justifiable reason for the need to seek an extension of time, and § 73-3-12(l)(e) 
are read together it becomes obvious that the 1982 notice is the type of published reason for 
delay that the statute contemplated. See Utah Bankers Ass'n v. American First Credit Union, 912 
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P.2d 988. 993 (Utah 1996) (provisions of a statute must be read as a whole not in an isolated 
piecemeal fashion). 
In sum, the notice on the fifth Extension Request did not strictly comply with § 73-3-
12( 1 )(e), and therefore, entry of summary judgement was reversible error. Without notice of the 
reason for the delay, the notice of the fifth Extension Request is statutorily defective as claimed 
by Mr. Longley in both his protest letter and his subsequent request for reconsideration. Notice 
which is statutorily defective is ineffective and void. Madsen, 896 P.2d at 23-24. 
3. The property descriptions in the published notice were statutorily defective 
and inadequate. 
The notice was also defective and void because, as discussed in part I above and 
incorporated herein by reference, it provided confusing and inadequate notice of the location of 
the wells at issue. (See R. 331-33.) The inadequacy of the notice was cited in every protest of 
the fifth Extension request. (R. 333.) Therefore, Mr. Longley cannot be denied standing based 
on a failure to file a protest before the deadline set forth in the defective notice. It is impossible 
to know, but must be assumed, that if an adequate notice had been published. Mr. Longley would 
have recognized the adverse impact on his water rights and would have timely protested the 
Extension Request. Mr. Longley certainly protested the fifth Extension Request promptly upon 
learning of it. (R. 333.)20 
20
 Leucadia has claimed that Mr. Longley did not file a protest by the May 14, 1994 
deadline set forth in the April 1994 newspaper notice, and, therefore, Mr. Longley was not a 
"party" to the proceedings and accordingly was without standing to bring a judicial appeal of the 
State Engineer's decision. However, until there is proper notice, Mr. Longley cannot be 
required to enter a timely protest. Leucadia further claims that even if the notice was 
inadequate, that Mr. Longley failed to file a protest once he had actual knowledge. Leucadia's 
Motion must fail because: (a) the notice lacked elements expressly required by statute and 
contained incomplete and confusing legal descriptions; (b) Mr. Longley did file a protest 
promptly upon obtaining actual knowledge; and (c) Mr. Longley is both an aggrieved "person" 
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and an aggrieved "party" entitled to obtain judicial review of the State Engineer's decision. 
In granting summary judgment, the trial court held, "Plaintiff lacks standing to seek 
judicial review of the State Engineer's decision approving Leucadia's Extension Request because 
he did not file a timely protest, and therefore, failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as 
required by Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14 (1993)." Yet, based upon the facts set forth in the 
Affidavit of Mr. Longley, he did need to file a timely protest. These issues of fact alone were 
sufficient to avoid entry of summary judgment. 
It should be noted that due to the lost file in the State Engineer's Office and the fact that 
when the file was found, Mr. Longley's protest was missing, a disputed material fact exists. 
Mr. Longley's Affidavit set forth ample evidence that the April 3, 1995 protest letter was mailed 
and received by the State Engineer's Office. There is a well established and long standing 
presumption that an item which is properly addressed with postage prepaid that is placed in the 
mail and not subsequently returned to the sender was delivered to the addressee. See e.g., 
Campbell v. Gowans, 100 P. 397 (Utah 1909); Hagnerv. United States, 285 U.S. 427 (1932); 
and Employment Security Commission v. Young. 713 P.2d 198 (Wyo. 1986). However, in this 
case, Mr. Longley need not rely on just that presumption. Utah law goes one step further in 
the case of documents mailed to governmental agencies such as the State Engineer, and deems 
the document to have been received and places the burden on the governmental agency to request 
a duplicate thereof upon learning that it was not received. The Utah "mailbox" statute, § 63-37-
1, states in pertinent part that: 
Any ... claim, ... statement or other document ... required or authorized to be 
filed or made to the state of Utah, or to any political subdivision thereof, which 
is ... (2) Mailed but not received by the state or political subdivision ... shall be 
deemed filed or made and received on the date it was mailed if the sender 
establishes by competent evidence that the ... document ... was deposited in the 
United States mail on or before the date for filing or paying; and in cases of such 
none receipt ..., the sender files with the state or political subdivision a duplicate 
within thirty days after written notification is given to the sender by the state or 
political subdivision of its nonreceipt . . . . 
Mr. Longley's affidavit provides competent evidence that he deposited the April 3, 1995 
protest letter in a properly addressed, postage prepaid envelope in the US mail. The State 
Engineer's Office has never specifically given written notice that the April 3, 1995 letter was 
not received or that Mr. Longley had thirty days in which to provide a duplicate thereof. That 
notwithstanding, Mr. Longley has provided a duplicate of the protest letter to the State Engineer 
as an attachment to the Complaint. Therefore, the April 3, 1995 protest letter is not only 
presumed, but deemed as a matter of law, to have been filed with the State Engineer's Office. 
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C. The State Engineer Did Not Comply with the Strict Requirements of § 73-3-
12(l)(e), Therefore, any Action Taken on Leucadia's Extension Application 
is Void. 
Because the published notice in this case is statutorily defective in a number of ways this 
court should reaffirm its core holding in W&G Co. v. Redevelopment Agency, 802 P.2d 755, 
which the trial court ignored. That case appropriately held that where statutory notice 
requirements are not met, the underlying "proceedings are void and those not properly notified 
are not bound by the proceedings because the giving of such notice is jurisdictional." Id, at 765 
(citing Salt Lake County v. Murray City Redevelopment, 598 P.2d 1339, 1344 (Utah 1979)). For 
the reasons mentioned above, the outcome in this case ought not be different. Like the plaintiff 
in W&G, who missed the 30-day statute of limitation by nearly 10 \ears, Mr. Longley missed 
by approximately 10 months, the 30-day protest period under § 73-3-7(1) that Appellees and the 
trial court relied upon to deny Mr. Longley standing. (R. 534-38.) Therefore, since the notice 
triggering the 30-day cut off was defective in this case, as it was in W&G, then the approval of 




 Leucadia will likely argue that because Mr. Longley did not see the notice, he cannot 
now complain about its inadequacy. However, such an argument begs the question of why he 
did not see the notice. Utah courts have addressed this issue by holding that the public cannot 
be charged with knowledge of the contents of a defective notice. W&G, 802 P.2d at 765. 
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CONCLUSION 
It is truly ironic that Leucadia and the State Engineer seek to prevent Mr. Longley from 
having his day in court based on a lack of standing for allegedly failing to file a timely protest. 
Indeed, the whole matter would be moot if Leucadia and the State Engineer were to hold 
themselves to the same standard they seek to impose on Mr. Longley. Leucadia was ten months 
to over four years late in filing its fifth Extension Request (which the State Engineer said he 
would not even accept). Similarly, the State Engineer was late in acting on the Request for 
Reconsideration, which was automatically denied by operation of law prior to the date on which 
the State Engineer purported to grant it. 
The State Engineer failed to give Mr. Longley the constitutionally and statutorily required 
notice or the actual notice as Mr. Longley specifically requested. The notice that was given was 
inadequate and confusing. Finally, Mr. Longley's due process rights have been violated. 
Therefore, this Court should declare the notice ineffectual and invalid and remand this case for 
trial on the merits. 
DATED this 12th day of May, 1997. 
jaig Sr 
Dav4d B. £iartvi£sen 
mette FN^o*ensen 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant 
Michael O. Londev 
NS500 [ . ( W I -43-
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
1 hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the BRIEF OF APPELLANT was mai 
first-class, postage prepaid, this 12th day of May, 1997 to: 
Richard C. Skeen 
Bryon J. Benevento 
Thomas W. Clawson 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & McCARTHY 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600 
P.O. Box 45340 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Attorneys for Leucadia Financial Corp. 
Gary G. Kuhlmann 
City Attorney 
City of St. George 
175 East 200 North 
St. George, UT 84770 
Attorney for City of St. George 
Michael M. Quealy 
John H. Mabey, Jr. 
Assistant Attorneys General 
1594 West North Temple, Suit^ 300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0855 
Attorneys for the State Engineer 
a-* 
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Tab A 
BEFORE THE STATE ENGINEER OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF APPLICATION ) 
) MEMORANDUM DECISION 
NUMBER 81-670 (A36857) ) 
Application No. 81-670 (A36857) now owned by Terracor, was filed 
to appropriate 6.0 cfs. of water for the irrigation of 350 acres 
of land, sole supply, and stock water for 200 cattle and domestic 
use of four families. The application was approved September 10, 
1965, and the application has been extended several times to the 
last proof due date of November 30, 1982, The applicant has 
filed another request for extension of time, and they stated the 
company had filed a petition in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court to al-
low them time to reorganize the company. The request was adver-
tised in the Washington County News from December 9 to 23, 1982, 
and was not protested. 
This application is orTe of several applications owned by the ap-
plicant for use in developing residential areas near St. George. 
The application has been approved for over twenty years, and when 
the State Engineer last extended the application, he did so with 
understanding further extensions would be critically reviewed and 
may be denied. The State Engineer has discussed the problems 
with the applicant on several occasions to determine what action 
should be taken on the current extension of time requests. As a 
result, several applications will be lapsed by the State En-
gineer. It is the opinion of the State Engineer that this par-
ticular application may be extended; however, it is also his 
opinion that there has been sufficient time to develop a project 
of this nature. 
It is, therefore, ORDERED and the request for extension of time 
on Application No. 81-670 (A86357) is hereby GRANTED to and in-
cluding November 30, 1989, with the condition that this shall be 
the last request granted and proof of appropriation shall be sub-
mitted on or before that date or the application will be lapsed. 
Requests for further extension of time will be denied. 
This decision is subject to the provisions of Section 73-3-14, 
Utah code Annotated 1953, which provides for plenary review by 
the filing of a civil action in the appropriate district court 
within sixty days from the date hereof. 
Dated this 30th day of December 1985. 
Robert L. Morgan, P.E., State Engineer 
By: Earl M. Staker, Deputy State Engineer 
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M E M O R A N D U M 
GERALD STOKER 
Area Engineer 
', JR JOHN H. MABEY  
Assistant Attorney General 
November 16, 1989 
Terracor (Leucadia Corp.) Extension of Time, 
Application No. 81-670~(A36857) 
RECEIVED 
NOV ?^ 19R0 
X \ . K 
Pursuant to our telephone conversation, I have reviewed 
the Attorney General's files and the State Engineer's files. 
There was no court appeal. The terms of the last extension 
granted are set out in the December 30r 1985 Memorandum Decision, 
attached. 
When I get back with Michael Longleyr a concerned deve-
loper in Hurricane area, I will tell him that there was no court 




cc: Robert L. Morgan 
Kent Jones 
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CHANGE OF WATER ,f j p M f If?jj 
STATE OF UTAH 
•I 
NOV 3 0 1989 '• oJ 
I oi thopuiposoof piovmmlKii d i vn t i ng wo iks a re completed and that vvatei is being ann lied to a beneficial use, 
pioo! o! permanent change of waiei is hereby submitted to the State Fngineei m arnmKttAT£ifliRIGiWTOCi Ifi 
of the I Mail Code Annotated 19,rr>, as amended. SALT LAKF 
WATER RIGHT NO. A I 
Natuie ol Change-. 
6 /O 
f-] ^feJ^ 7 
CHANCT APPL NO. a r > J ^ l 
. _ Point of Diversion 
._ _ Place of Use 





Penod of Use 
. Nature of Use 
1. OWNER INFORMATION 
Name: T e r r a c o r , I n c 
Address: 529 E a s t S o u t h T e m p l e S t . 
City: S a l t Lake C i t y
 S t a t e : 
6 . 0 2 7 
Interest °/ 
U t a h 
2. QUANTITY OF WATER: 
3. SOURCE: U n d e r g r o u n d W a t e r 
which is tributary to 
which is tributary to 
POINT(S) OF DIVERSION: 
_cfs and/or. 
.Zipcode: 




COUNTY: W a s h i n g t o n 
Description of Diverting Works and Carrying Works: One 12" wel l and f ive 8" w e l l s , 600 f t . deep, 
24,000 f t . of 18", 14" and 12" p ipe l i n e , boos te r pumps and pres su re reduct ion and 
meter s t a t i o n connect ing t o the S t . George Ci ty 36" d i a . Quail Creek cu l ina ry 
t r a n s m i s s i o n l i n e . 
4. POINT(S)OFREDIVERSION 
The water is rediverted from 
.at a point 
Desoi ipI ion of Diverting Works and Carrying Works: 
5. POINT(S) OF RETURN 
The amount of water consumed is. 
The amount of water relumed i s _ 
_xfsor_ 
.cfsor_ 





Capacity: _ _ 
Height of dam 
Storage Period: Irom _ to 
ac-ft. Inundated Area: ___ acres 
feet 
Legal d e s c r i p t i o n ^ 
domest ic water t a n k s . The t h r e e tanks l oca t ed in the Bloominqton area a r c as Coll fol lows: 
W1/4NWT74, Sec.~l~arid'l^V4"NET74"7~Sec. 17~all in T43S, R15W and NW1/4NWU4, Sec. T2, 
T43S7~RT6W, SLB&M. J^^/VLG?TDAn 
* These items are to be completed by the Division of Water Rights j ^ t^jViuI'-ii 
Chungerroor 
7. Thr vvalei Lsuscdbupplementallvy he lnllowingrightsThe c u l i n a r y j h t s of: 
St. . G e o r g e C1 t y _ _^  __ 
8. NATURE AND PERIOD OF USE 
Irrigation: ITom JlfLITi J_l_Li_ to N Q V - 3 Q t h 
Siockwalermg: ITom ^1L:__ JjLLi_ to J ^ c . _ 3 J _ s t _ L 
Domeslic.- from .±*\\.:.. J J L L ^ _ to _I^£L._ J ± 5 l : 
Municipal: Emm L r?.il:_1 ?.L__ to . i ? ^ £ j _ l . l £ l j . . 
Mining: Emm to 
tower: Emm to 
()({)(.,•. Liu lust r i a l & From Jslil- J_sJr_i__ to J^Sl2i 3 1 s t . 
Hoc r e a t i ona 1. 
<). PURPOSE AND EXTENT OF USE 
Irrigation: acres. Sole supply of ___5 . acres 
Siockwalermg (number and kind): 250 c a t t l e , 10 h o r s e s , 50 swine, 100 p o u l t r y 
Domestic: _ _ Families and/or Persons 
Municipal (name): -l^__Geor_ge_C_i ty_ 
Mining: . Mining District in the Mine 
Ores mined: __. . 
Power: Plant name: Type: Capacity: 
Other (describe): 
10. PLACE OE USE 
Legal description ot place of use by 40 acre tract(s): ( S e e A t t a c h e d ) 
I. WATER MEASUREMENT 
Water measured by (name)- J a m e s N. Ward 
l)a l t ; . November 3 0 , |g_ 
Mel hod ol measurement: 
(Give suliicient data m "EXPLANATORY" to enable the State Engineer to check the water measurement.) 
12. EXPLANATORY (Use additional pages of same size if necessary) 
Measurements have been made a t v a r i o u s wel l s i t e s by m e t e r s . The i n t e n t i s t o have 
c o n t r o l l e d pumping not t o exceed 6 c f s . However, some w e l l s vary from 450 gpm t o 
900 gpm" in capaci ty^ Al l w e l l s a r e equipped wi th" t o t a l flow measuring dev ices t o 
record a c c u r a t e , annual p r o d u c t i o n s . 
(I ill in blank spaces but do not sign until proof has been submitted to the State Engineer and accepted as sufficient.) 
CERTIFICATE OF APPLICANT 
STATE OF UTAH ^ ) ss. 
COUNTY OF S a l t Lake j 
C.^_£ruce_J iLLLer being first duly sworn, certify that I am the person, assignee 
or ageni of the person who filed in the State Engineer's office Application No. a 6393
 ; (hat I, as 
appropriaior, employed J a m e s N. Ward to compile information for the purpose of 
completion ot proot ot permanent change and that I hereby accept and submit this written proof together with 
tracings consisting ot sheet Nos. 1 to ] inch; that said facts and 
tracings are hereby submitted, and that each and all items contained herein are true to the best of my 
knowledge and belief. 
Applicant or His Agent 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this day of , 19 . . 
My commission expires , 19 
Notary Public 
CERTIFICATE OF PROOF ENGINEER 
STATE OF UTAH ) ss. 
COUNTY OF _.. Sa.l_t_La_k_o j 
J aJu .G_s^w- . Ward being first duly sworn, certify that I was employed 
lo prepare prool of permanent change under Application No. a 6 3 9 3 . \\ra\ \\U] accompanying 
l lacings were prepared (roni (ieki notesoI a survey made by me between the ^ l l t i L and _"__.__ days ol 
November 19 8
 () that these tracings, labeled as sheet Nos. 
_.to 
inch, when combined with the writ ten proof fully describe the met hod and extent of beneficial use of the water 





Subscribed and sworn to before me this 




(Seal of Proof Engineer) 
19 
Notary Public 
STATE ENGINEER'S ENDORSEMENTS 
Date 
.Applicalion received in State Eng. office; Approved. 
Proof of Permanent Change due in State Engineer's office 
._J_L_3.D_r£4_Writlen proof and maps received in State Eng. office by 
Written proof and maps returnedforcorrectionby 
Field checked by 
.Corrected written proof and maps examined and certificate written by. 
.Certificate of Permanent Change issuedj^ Nfo. 
.Maps, profiles, cind drawings are 
iss ed FN  _ _ _ ^ _ _ _ 
filed J}'<y[QlA)yxh ntf.JQjL ilAj&JzkJ^ 
This 
requ 
written proof and the maps, profiles, and drawings pertaining thereto, are found to comply with the 
irements of the Laws of Utah, and the same are hereby approved. 
19. 
State Engineer 
Proof of Appropriation 
on Change Appl icat ion No. a_ 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR COMPLETING AND SUBMITTING 
PROOF OF PERMANENT CHANGE 
Proofs ol Permanent Change of Wcitur must be prepared by a registered engineer or licensed land surveyor. Each 
proof shall consist of two parts: (a) a written proof and (b) a sheet or sheets of maps, and drawings. The proof 
must indicate that the water sought to be changed has been applied to beneficial use, as provided in the Change 
Application. Any amendments necessary must be made and the proof returned to the office within the time 
allowed by the Slate Engineer. 
Change Proof on Water Right No. 8 1-670, Change Appl. No. a-6393 
PI,ACE OF USE 
Legal description of place of use by 4 0 acre tract(s) 








T 4 3 S , 


























































TOTAL PROJECT AREA: 3490 acres 




APPLICATION NO. 81-670 (A36857) 
CHANGE APPLICATION 0-6393 
JAMES N. WARD 
PROOF ENGINEER 
LICENSE NO. 3170 
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TabD 
BEFORE THE STATE ENGINEER OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
INVTHE MATTER OF CHANGE APPLICATION ) 
) MEMORANDUM DECISION 
NUMBER 81-670 (a6393) ) 
Change Application Number 81-670 (a6393) was filed by TERRACOR to permanently 
change the point of diversion, place of use and nature of use of 6.027 cfs of 
Watert, from, underground water wells. The watertight is .evidenced by 81-669 
(A36856 Certificate,Number 8627) and 81-670 (A36857^pending-approved). The 
change application Was approved AUgust 6,^1971/under "memorandum decision with 
the condition that "proof of appropriation shall be submitted on or before the 
^oof due date or the application will be lapsed". The sUbject Water rights were 
granted extensions of time to and including November 30, 1989: On November 30, 
1989> a proof of permanent change was filed by James N. Ward, P.E., for TERRACOR. 
"On^  July 11, 1990, srepresentatives of the State Lngineer^completed a field 
examination of the proof of permanent; change (also to'v include a proof of 
appropriation on 81-670 A36857).< The descriptions on the subject proof are not 
correct, nor do they accurately describe^ field conditions! There were no wells 
equipped,^no totalizing meters, no pipeline,' and no connection into the St. 
George-Quail Creek pipeline as stated in the proof; There is no evidence that 
the water had been placed to beneficial Use. 
It is the opinion of the State Engineer that the applicant and proof engineer 
have not complied with rules and regulations governing the filing of proofs of 
appropriation and permanent changes and that this documentation must be rejected. 
Further, that the applications are lapsed for failure to meet the requirements 
Under Section 73-3-16 Utah Code Annotated, 1953* 
It is, therefore, ORDERED and the Proof of Permanent Change submitted under 81-
670 (a6393) which included certificated Water Right Number 81-669 (A36856 
Certificate Number 8627) and Application to Appropriate Number 81-670 (A36857) 
is hereby REJECTED and Change Application Number 81-670 (a6393) and Application 
to Appropriate Number 81-670 (A36857) afe hereby LAPSED for failure to comply 
with statutory requirements and place the Water to beneficial Use. 
this, Decision is .subject to the provisions of Rule R655-6-i7^ (1992 Utah 
Administrative Code-7formerly R625) of *(the .Division of WaterMights and to 
Sections 63-46b-13 and 73-3-14 of the Utah Code Annotated, 19537 ^ hich provide 
for filing either a Request for Reconsideration'With the StateJEngineer or an 
appeal with the appropriate District CoUftfv:A Request,for\ Reconsideration must 
be filed with the State Engineer within 20 "days of the'date of this Decision. 
However, a Request for Reconsideration is not a prerequisite to filing a court 
appeal. A court appeal must be filed within 30 days after the date of this 
Decision, or if a Request for Reconsideration has been filed, within 30 days 
after the date the Request for Reconsideration is denied. A Request for 
Reconsideration is considered denied when no action is taken 20 days after the 
Request is filed. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CHANGE APPLICATION NUMBER 
81 669 and 81-670 
PAGE( 2 
Dated this 10th day of July, 1992. 
Robert >er L. Morgan* P-E, j/^ate^ngin eer 
RLM:GWS:jb 
Mailed a copy of the foregoing Memorandum Decision on this 10th day of July, 
1992, to: 
TERRACOR 
529 East South Temple Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
Judy Barbour/, Secretary 
TabE 
Norman H. Bangertcr 
Governor 
i)ev C Hanson 
Executive Director 
Hubert L Morgan 
Stale Engineer 
Statl of Utah 
DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES 
DIVISION OF WATER RIGHTS 
1636 West Notth Temple. Suite 220 
Salt Lake City, Ulan 84 I t 6-31 56 
801-538-7240 
August 3, 1992 
TERRACOR 
529 East South Temple Street 
Salt Lake City UT 84102 
Dear Applicant: RE: Reconsideration of Rejected/Lapsed Application 
Number 81-670 (a6393) 
A request for reconsideration has been received by our office on July 30, 1992. 
We will review the request and keep you informed of further action regarding this 
application. If no action is taken within 20 days of the date the request was 
received in our office, the request is considered denied. 
If you have questions, please contact our office. 
Sjncerely, 
Kent L. Jones, P.E., 
Assistant State Engineer for Appropriation 
KLJ:jb 
cc: Regional Office 
James N Ward and Associates 
ATT.N James N Ward 
555 East South Temple Street 
Salt Lake City UT 84102 
an equal opportunity employe/ 
TabF 
State of Utah 
DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES 
DIVISION OF WATER RIGHTS 
1636 West North Temple. Suite 220 
Sail Lake City, Utah 84 116-3156 
801-538-7240 January 3 1 , 1994 
801-538-7315 (Fax) 
LEUCADIA FINANCIAL CORPORATION 
529 EAST SOUTH TEMPLE STREET 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84102 
RE: Application No. 81-670 (a6393) 
Dear Applicant: 
This is to acknowledge receipt of your request for an extension of time; however, 
it is hereby returned to you because of one or more of the following reasons: 
You did not have your signature properly notarized 
You have until your proof-due date, or if your proof-due date has passed, you 
have ten additional days from the date of this letter to return the extension 
request properly completed or the application shall lapse. 
If you have any questions, feel free to contact us here at the Division. 
Yours very truly, 
Dana Dredge (' 
Extension Secretary 
Enclosure 




Robert Ii. Morgan 
State Enzinoer 
TabG 
BEFORE THE STATE ENGINEER OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
I O H M APPLICATION ' AMENDED 
NUMBER*81-670 (A36857) AND CHANGE j MEMORANDUM DECISION 
APPLICATION NUMBER 81-670 (a6393) ) 
Application Number 81-670 (a6393) was filed by TERRACOR^to'permanently change the 
point of diversion?! place of use^and nature of Usej,ofj6i027Acfs of Water from 
Underground water wells. * The water trightr is**evidencedf*by 381-669. (A36856 
Certificate 8627) and 81-670 (A36857 pending-approved)v^jAppI ication Number 81-
670 (A36857) was approved September 10, 1965,*and Change Application Number a6393 
Was, approved August 6,v1971> under memorandum decisionals jtibjectWater rights 
were ^ approved^ by ,the State Engineer and granted^etftensions ,6f "time to and 
including November 30, 1989* under Memorandum Decision^ Which is substantially 
beyond,, th6i* 14" year,period. 'Vjhe^lastkiextenHoh^6f^tifhe^§ ^granted .With a 
condition thatJthis^shall be^thejlast ^eqU^st^[fofle5("ler!§i6n]:^granted and proof 
ofe^ppropriation shall^bersubmitted on,6r^beforesthaij^ 
orTthe application will be lapsed^ Requests forlfiTrthenlexiension of time will 
be denied." On November 30, 1989^ a proof of appropriation and permanent change 
wa^4filed by^ James Ns vWard, iP*E*, for TERRACOR < (aka ^ LeUcadia Financial 
Corporation). 
On July 11, 1990, representatives^ of
 t the State ^Engiheer^completed a field 
examination of the proof of permanent change (also 'to .include a proof of 
appropriation on 81-670 (A36857). The descriptions on the subject proof are not 
decreet, nor do they accurately describe field conditions." There were no wells 
equipped, no totalizing meters, no pipeline, and no connection into the St. 
George-QUail Creek pipeline as stated in the>proofj tTherelis no evidence that 
the water had been placed to beneficial use. 
It,was the opinion of the State Engineer that the applicant and proof engineer 
had not complied with rules and regulations governing the filing of proofs of 
appropriation and permanent changes and that this documentation must be rejected. 
The State Engineer rejected the proof of change by memorandunfdecision dated July 
10, '1992* and lapsed Water Right Number 81-670*
 K However*}*: previous to the 
rejection**on 'September 21, 1990,
 xa request was^received by the State Engineer 
fVom C\t Brucd'Miller* President>of LeUcacMa Financial Corporation, to withdraw 
the xt>roof ,of
 (appr6priation and<proofvof^)ermaneht^ for an 
extension of time/beyond the l4*yeTaf; ffe?ibdK%as^also;receiVea<on September 21, 
1990, xin whkh*^the> a p p l i c a n t financial 
considerations'due to Jack bf'sUf£icTe^ of 
the water aquifer, Time is required ,toMcdri^ 
forffull developments intendedYv/' 
The St&te Engineer also received a reqtlest^foK reconsideration of the July 10, 
1992, Memorandum Decision and on Aligust 2 0 ^ 1992^ granted that request for 
reconsideration and took the application under review, M After reviewing the 
information before him, the State Engineer is of the opinion that rejecting the 
proof and lapsing the applications for failure
 tto comply With statutory 
requirements may have been inappropriate since the proof upon which the action 
was being taken had been requested to be withdrawn. The State Engineer is 
further of the opinion that the applic&tioh" should be reinstated and the 
extension request filed on September 21 $ 1990, should be advertised and processed 
accordinq to statutory requirements* 
• : : « T w u " - r r - y . v . •'*••••. v<; •-••••• .... .- • . • • ,- . • .
 ; ...'.;.' ••••••• .••••'-' ,•.'••••• -> .«,<•' • - . . - • • •••••••••• 
••It lis .therefore, ORDERED and the rejection of the proof-for Change Application 
.Number 18-670 (a6393) which included Application to' Appropriate Number 18-670 
(A36857)t:and Certificated Water right Number,8i;-669'(A36856).;;ahd • the lapsing of.'-
[Change. Application Number 81-670 (a6393) and Appl icati6nT>tb?Appropriate.Number", 
.:81^670;,(A36857): according to the July 10, 1992,.-Memorandum Decision are hereby 
.RESCINDED.and the' applications are REINSTATED;- -Mhe'priority of itheappl ications 
hasCbeenTlkfjusted to reflect the fil ingdate of the extehsiohlbf• time request 
.•,filedASeptember-;2l,'- 1990, and the extension vreqUest;will be processed according 
;.t6';:statutory^reqUirementsU;;< :•'• -^&±-;^^-%£^£& 'M^^t}^u%'-~;<if •;•?.-> ;.* • 
!;jHisjj.Oe'cisi on Ms..subject-to. the provision^ ofxRule, R655-6^18 6f,( the Division of •' 
;Water,.Rights:and to Sections 63-46b-14 and.73=3rl'4"-6f •.the.Utah Code Which provide 
:for:.;thef:fil ing of. an.appeal with-the-; appropri ate ^ Di strict. CourtiwA court appeal 
^shallSbeafiled, within 30 days after the: date; of- this Decision:^]-!" .;• .-:.-: <•. • 
U§0-''iiiiY\t-::' • ;•.-'•,;••••• >•'.'$..;. .•;• y*,; • t\::p;rJ': •'.•iT:;»:-<^ <.u-v ^ V e * ' WiKv:; ••*'•<•. 
;..Dkted.;:this;31 s.t day of January, M994.^ vV^ ;^'vv^>^CC^ U^'u^:-U:- .•:• • -! 
^Mailed.vatcopy of..the foregoing MemorandumVDecisiofi- thisj 31st; day of January} : 
TabH 
T i l t DAILY ^ 
I' () Hot M, U) i l ' j S M.i.n M »'() (Jot ' ' ^ 
•,'U) N M.«,n M »' () llox J4) 




tions requesting an EX-
TENSION OF T I M E 
WITHIN WHICH TO 
S U B M I T P R O O F OF 
BENEFICIAL USE have 
been filed with the Slate 
Engineer. It is repre-
sented that additional time 
is needed to place the wa-
ter to beneficial use in 
Washington County. 
Persons objecting to an 
application must file a 
Protest stating the reasons 
for the protest. To have 
Cont. on next column 
hearing hcloic (he Slate 
Engineer, persons must 
request a hearing in the 
Protest. Protest must he 
filed in duplicate with the 
State Engineer . In 36 
West North Temple. Sail 
Lake Cilv. Utah N4 I Id. 
(801-538-7240) on or be-
fore Mav 14. 1994. 
(PROTESTS MUST BE 
LEGIBLE WITH A RE-
TURN ADDRESS) . 
These arc formal proceed-
ings as per Rule R655-6-2 
of the Division ot Water 
Rights. 
(LEGEND: Point(s) ol 
Diversion = POD. Place 
of Use = POU: Nature ol 
Use = USE) 
Sl-d70(ad393): Terracor 
(Leucadia f inanc ia l 
Corp.) proposes to change 
the POD of waier as 
evidenced bv 81 -670 
(A36857) & 8 1-669 
(A36856) . HERETO-
FORE: QUANTITY: 
6.027 cfs. SOURCE: 
Underground Water Well. 
PODf (1) S 100 W I 100 
from El/4 Cor. Sec 22. 8 
in. well 45 ft. deep (2) N 
1491 E 155 from Wl/4 
Cor, Sec 23 . T 4 3 S , 
R16W, 16 in. well 55 ft. 
deep. USE: Irrigation: 
from Mar I to Nov 30. 
total acreage 400.00 acs. 
sole supply 350.00 acs; 
Stockwatenng: 273 head 
of livestock; Domestic: 5 
families. POU. Sees 5. 
6. 7. 8, T43S, R15W; 
Sees II , 12, 13. 14. 15. 
E l / 2 Sec 22; N l / 2 . 
S W I M Sec 23 . T 4 3 S . 
R I 6 W . HEREAFTER: 
QUANTITY: 6.027 cfs 
SOURCE: Underground 
Water Wel ls . > O D : 
Same as Heretofore, but 
addine the following 16 
in. wells 0 to 800 ft. 
deep: (I) S 50 E 2531. 
(2) S 2343 E 253 from 
NW Cor, Sec 25, (3) S 50 
E 50 from NW Cor, (4) S 
50 W 66. (5) S 2343 W 
50 from NE Cor, (6) S. 
2343 E 2970 from NW 
Gar . Sec 26, T 4 2 S . 
R14W. USE: Same as 
Heretofore but adding 
domestic, municipal, re-
creational &. industrial. 
. Existing uses will dimin-
ish as new uses arc deve-
loped. POU: Same as 
Heretofore. 
Robert L. Morgan. P.E. 
STATE ENGINEER 
Pub#L2837 . publ ished 
April 1, 7 & 14. 1994 
The Daily Spectrum 
PROOF OF PUBLICATION 
STATE OF UTAH SS: 
COUNTY OF WASHINGTON 
Becky Myers, being 
duly sworn, deposes & 
says that she is the 
Classified Bookkeeper 
of the daily newspaper 
published at St. Georc
 e 
Washington County, 
State of Utah and that 
the Notice 
"• Linl 
a true copy of which i s 
hereto attached, was 
published in said 
newspaper in its . 
issue dated the f 
day of ffPXlL 197y 
and was published 
again in the issues 
:>f said ne/yspaper 
i a t e d : >n^j?if 
f o r a t o t a l of 
i n s e r t i o n ( s ) . 
^tfs 
•k * A- / * * * ' 
S u b s c r i b e d and Si"?™/? 
b e f a t ^ c f , t- hi •-, ^ ^ / v 
Not ,\ i y Pu"b I 
i c : ; i d i i n ] . i l 
l i , i : , h i i n ] l o n i < > i i i I '. 
Wt2u 
a-frPiCHh&'T xx@ 
*/5 EAST ST GEORGE mvn ' 
Tab I 
j r i S * UTAH 
§ L J P NATURAL RESOURCE 
%nr Water Rights 
1636 West North Temple • Suite 220 • Soil Lake City. UT 84116-3156 • (801)533-6071 
If .RECEIVFD 
APPLICATION NO. 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF 
IN THE OFFICE OF THE STATE ENGINEER OF THE STATE OF UTA>I } , O J ^ 
REQUEST FOR REINSTATEMENT AND EXTENSION OF TIME , 
(After Fourteen Years) V v / ' Alf.:ii HiGHTS 
81--670 (a6393) 
Washington 
Applicant's present address 
Leucadia Financial Corporation 
529 East South Temple St. 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
being first duly sworn that he is the (agent of the) owner of the above 
numbered application; that the information given is true and correct to the best of his knowledge. 
Describe briefly the type and extent of construction completed to date, and cause fo( delay. 
Causes for delay are financial considerations due to lack of sufficient 
testing to determine the reliability of the water aquifer. Time is 
required to coiplete the testing and affirm its value for full development 
as intended (see enclosure) 
Pursuant to Section 73-3-12, Utah Code Annotated 1953 (as amended), request is made for reinstatement 




APPLICANT (If a corporation, give title of officer signing.) 
QuU'jantyflJjfljll ^ l ^ j ¥fl UUl>re me this . . day of T ^ X H ^ Z ^ 
i L. Vo«1Ur 
l a t y . U M l 041C2 
UMlfW Expires 




1 9 ^ 
REQUEST RECEIVED 9 / 2 4 / 9 0 
RECEIPT NO 29315 
BEGINNING __ 




FOR OFFICE USE ONLY 
ADV. FEE $50 RECD. $5Q,QQ 
NOTICE PUBLISHED WEEKLY IN. 
AND ENDING . 
BY LZ 
_14 YEAR PERIOD ENDS 3offl 





EXTENSION REQUEST Fcxm 30 an equal opportunity employer Rev 1/88 001070 
Tab J 
Hurricane Valley Mutual Water Co. 
c/o Michael O. Longley 
P.O. Box 51 
Hurricane, UT 84737 
April 3, 1995 
Mr. Robert L. Morgan, State Engineer 
Division of Water Rights 
1636 West North Temple, Suite 220 
Salt Lake City, UT 84116-3156 
Re: Water Right No. (a6393) 81-670, 81-669 
Dear Mr. Morgan: 
I am a real estate developer in Washington County south of Hurricane. In connection with 
my real estate development I own several water rights and am affiliated with the Hurricane Valley 
Mutual Water Company that provides water service to this area. Hurricane Valley Mutual Water 
Company also owns a fairly substantial number of water rights in this area. The only culinary 
quality well associated with my water rights and Hurricane Valley Mutual Water Company's water 
rights is located in the Sand Mountain area approximately one mile east from the general area in 
which the points of diversion authorized in change application a6393 are located. 
During the past months The Spectrum, a local newspaper in the St. George area, reported 
an agreement between the City of St. George, Leucadia Corporation and the Washington County 
Water Conservancy District regarding the Leucadia water rights in this area. This agreement is of 
particular concern to me and I am sure other owners of waters in the Sand Mountain area. I was 
surprised at these reports because my understanding was that the Leucadia water rights hud been 
lapsed. To revisit these applications with the potential of reviving them will prejudice my water 
rights and Hurricane Valley Mutual Water Company's water rights. Further I have serious 
concerns with the procedural history of this water right. 
These water rights were filed in April 1965 and approved in September the same year. 
Water Right No. 81-670 contemplated a diversion of 6.0 cfs for the beneficial uses of irrigating 
400 acres, stockwatering 200 cattle and domestic use of 4 families. Water Right No. 81-669 was 
certificated for the domestic use of one family and stockwatering 73 cattle. 
These water rights were acquired by Terracor for use in their Bloomington project. In 
1970 Terracor filed change application a6393 to change the point of diversion from sections 22 
and 23 in T43S, R16W, SLB&M at Atkinville, south of the Virgin River, to multiple points of 
diversion in the Sand Mountain area, approximately 12 miles east of the original points of 
diversion. This change application was approved over the protest of the BLM. It is questionable 
whether this change if submitted today would be approved because of criteria developed by your 
office in considering the approval of change applications. 
Proof of appropriation on change application a6393 was first due November 30, 1973. In 
approving additional time in which to submit proof on this water right, then State Engineer, Dee 
C. Hansen states, "It is questioned by the State Engineer whether the applicant has complied with 
Mr. Robert L. Morgan 
April 3, 1995 
Page 2 
the provisions of 73-3-12, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, which allows the State Engineer to grant 
extensions of time to applicants 'on proper showing of diligence or reasonable cause for delay.' 
However, we feel that notice of our policy and intentions must be given to each applicant before a 
request for an extension of time can be denied." 
In approving an additional extension of time in 1977, Mr. Hansen states, "Further requests 
for extension will be seriously questioned." 
The request for extension of time granted in 1980 was conditioned on the "understanding 
that requests for further extension of time will be critically reviewed and may be denied unless 
there is sufficient evidence supporting due diligence or reasonable cause for delay." [Emphasis in 
original.] 
You granted an additional extension of time in 1985 with the following language: 
It is the opinion of the State Engineer that this particular application may be 
extended; however, it is also his opinion that there has been sufficient time to develop a 
project of this nature. 
It is... ORDERED and the request for extension of time ...is ... hereby granted ... with the 
condition that this shall be the last request granted and proof of appropriation shall be 
submitted on or before the date or the application will be lapsed. Requests for further 
extension of time will be denied." 
On November 30, 1989, the proof due date, the applicant submitted proof of 
appropriation for these water rights. However, according to your Memorandum Decision dated 
July 10, 1992, on field examination of the proof, representatives of the state engineer found: 
The descriptions on the subject proof are not correct, nor do they accurately describe field 
conditions. There were no wells equipped, no totalizing meters, no pipeline, and no 
connection into the St. George-Quail Creek pipeline as stated in the proof. There is no 
evidence that the water had been placed to beneficial use. 
As a result of these findings, in your Memorandum Decision dated July 10, 1992, you ordered the 
proof rejected and the water rights lapsed for failure to comply with statutory requirements. 
A request for reconsideration of this memorandum decision was filed on July 30, 1992. 
The letter from Kent Jones dated August 3, 1992 acknowledges receipt of the Request for 
Reconsideration on July 30 and states, "If no action is taken within 20 days of the date the request 
was received in our office, the request is considered denied." The statutory basis for 
reconsideration and the period of time within which to file a request for reconsideration is §63-
46b-13 (b) UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953, as amended which states: 
If the agency head or the person designated for that purpose does not issue an order 
within 20 days after the filing of the request, the request for reconsideration shall be 
considered to be denied. 
Mr. Robert L. Morgan 
April 3, 1995 
Page 3 
Twenty days from July 30, 1992, is August 19, 1992 because July has 31 days. However, 
you granted the Request for Reconsideration on August 20, 1992, which was beyond the 20 day 
period allowed under § 63-46b-13 (b) UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953, as amended. Rule 6 (a) of 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states regarding the computation of time within which action must 
be taken: 
In computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by these rules, by the local rules of 
any district court, by order of court, or by any applicable statute, the day of the act, event, 
or default from which the designated period of time begins to run shall not be included. 
The last day of the period so computed shall be included, unless it is a Saturday, a Sunday, 
or a legal holiday, in which even the period runs until the end of the next day which is not 
a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday. 
According to this provision, the date you received the Request for Reconsideration, July 
30, is not counted in the twenty day computation period. However, the last day of the twenty day 
period, August 19, is counted. August 19, 1992 was a Wednesday; it was not a Saturday, a 
Sunday, or a legal holiday. As a result there was no reason to extend the time in which you were 
required to act in granting the Request for Reconsideration. Your action granting reconsideration 
on the 21st day after receipt of the Request was not within the scope of your authority and is 
void. As a result the Memorandum Decision dated July 10, 1992, lapsing the water right became 
final agency action because the applicant did not appeal the denial of your request for 
reconsideration to the District Court within 30 days as required by §63-46b-14. Your later 
Amended Memorandum Decision dated January 31, 1994, was also without authority because the 
applications were lapsed by the July 10, 1992 Memorandum Decision which became final agency 
action. 
Even if these procedural defects arexiisregarded, the public notice regarding the extension 
of time within which to submit proof that you authorized under the January 31, 1994 Amended 
Memorandum Decision is inconsistent, faulty, inadequate, confusing and erroneous for the 
following reasons: the "heretofore" quantity of water is 6.0 cfs while the "hereafter" quantity is 
6.027 cfs; the hereafter point of diversion designated "(1)" contains no reference to the 
subdivision monument, section, township or range in which it is located; the "hereafter" point of 
diversion designated "(2)" contains no reference to the township or range in which the point of 
diversion is located; the "hereafter" point of diversion designated "(3)" contains no reference to 
the township and range in which the point of diversion is located; the "hereafter" point of 
diversion designated "(4)" contains no reference to a subdivision monument, township or range in 
which the point of diversion is located; and the "hereafter" point of diversion designated "(5)" 
contains no reference to the section, township or range in which the point of diversion is located. 
Based upon these publication defects, a republication should be made to apprise the public of the 
actual changes. 
In summary sufficient time has been allowed to develop this water right and the applicant 
has failed to place the waters to beneficial use. The procedural and publication defects associated 
with these water rights indicate first that these water rights have lapsed as a matter of law. Second 
Mr. Robert L. Morgan 
April 3, 1995 
Page 4 
in the event some procedural defect prevents the lapsing of the water rights, the publication 
associated with the latest request for extension of time is inadequate and should be republished. I 
request that you cease any additional activities regarding these water rights until you address 
these defects. Please contact and inform me of all actions and hearings regarding these 
applications. 
Very truly yours, 
/ * / 
Michael O. Longley 
LONGt08.LET 
TabK 
IN THE MATTER OF CHANGE APPLICATION ) 
) MEMORANDUM DECISION 
NUMBER 81-670 (a6393) ) 
Change Application Number 81-670 (a6393) was filed by Terracor to permanently 
change the point of diversion, place of use and nature of use of 6.027 cfs of 
water from wells. The hereafter of the change allows for 8 points of diversion 
located in Section 23, T43S, R16S, SL8&M, and Sections 25 and 26, T42S, R14W, 
SLB&M. The water right is evidenced by 81-669 (A36856, Certificate Number 8627} 
and 81-670 (A36857 pending - approved). The change application was approved 
August 6, 1971, and extension requests were filed and granted to November 30, 
1989. Proof of Appropriation of water was filed on November 30, 1989, and was 
later withdrawn. A new extension request was filed on September 21, 1990, the 
same day the proof was withdrawn. By Memorandum Decision dated July 10, 1992, 
the State Engineer rejected the proof and lapsed the change application and the 
application right under 81-670. Because the proof had been requested to be 
withdrawn, and the new extension filed, the State Engineer reinstated the file 
by memorandum decision dated January 31, 1994, and processed the extension 
request. 
The extension request was advertised in The Daily Spectrum from February 3 to 
February 17, 1995, and readvertised from April 1 to April 19, 1995, and was 
protested by Hurricane City, Washington County Water Conservancy District and a 
late protest was filed by Winding River Associates. The Washington County Water 
Conservancy District protest was later withdrawn. A hearing was not held. 
The extension request indicates that financial considerations have delayed the 
project and more time is needed to complete the testing and to put the water to 
beneficial use. The underlying application on Water Right Number 81-670 was 
approved September 10, 1965. Since that time, limited efforts have been made to 
develop the right and use the water. Change Application Number 81-670 (a6393) 
was approved August 6, 1971, to allow for the uses of irrigation, stockwatering, 
domestic, municipal, recreation and industrial* 
The water rights upon which the change was based had as their limit of use the 
irrigation at 400 acres, limited to the sole irrigation supply of 350 acres with 
50 acres used supplementally, stockwatering of 273 cattle or equivalent, and the 
domestic purposes of 5 families. HTiis would equate to the annual diversion of 
2259.89 acre-feet and would be the maximum allowable diversion under both rights. 
Under the last extension granted in the December 30, 1985, memorandum decision, 
the applicant was put on notice that proof of appropriation had to be submitted 
by November 30, 1989, and requests "for further extension of time will be 
denied". This action was based on the requirements under section 73-3-12, Utah 
Cod rotated, 1953, that the State Engine^ can grant extensions of time only 
"or per s^  wing of diligence or rea* .ole cause for delay". The State 
Engineer was the opinion, based on a jew of the information available, that 
the applicant ay i.jt be complying wi c* .he statutory criteria as evidenced by 
the amount of water rhat had been put to beneficial use. 
"
:nce the extension request -as filed, the City of St. George has entered into 
rchase agreement with ' cadia Financial Corporation, the current owner of 
zater rights, and has i? cated that upon approval of the extension they will 
• . ; ete the transaction to purchase this water right. The City further 
in< jated that they need this water to meet the anticipated future requirements 
of the public which constitutes reasonable and due diligence as required by the 
06.2S-95 08:56 FAX SO! 53fc 7467
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CHANGE APPLICATION NUMBER 
81-670 (a6393 
PAGE 2 
statute. The State Engineer is of the opinion, that if the right is conveysd to 
St. George City, as evidenced by the agreement in place, the extension can be 
granted. 
It is, therefore, ORDERED and Extension of time within which to submit proof is 
GRANTED on Application Number 81-670 (A36857) and Change Application Number 81-
670 (a6393) to and including November 30, 1996, with the following conditions: 
1. The application is limited to the annual diversion of 2259.89 acre-
feet for the proposed uses. 
2. This extension is approved only for use by the City of St. George to 
be used to meet the city's reasonable future needs and the right 
must be conveyed to the city, prior to November 30, 1996. 
This extension is granted in accordance with the law which states; "The 
construction of the works and the application of water to beneficial use shall 
be diligently prosecuted to completion within the time fixed by the State 
Engineer. Extensions of time ... may be granted by the State Engineer on proper 
showing of diligence or reasonable cause for delay ... In the consideration of 
an application to extend the time in which to place the water to beneficial use 
under an approved application, . •. the State Engineer shall deny such extension 
and declare the application lapsed, unless the applicant affirmatively shows that 
he has exercised or is exercising reasonable and due diligence in working toward 
completion of the appropriation," 
This Decision is subject to the provisions of Rule R655-6-17 of the Division of 
Water Rights and to Sections 63-46b-13 and 73-3-14 of the Utah Code Annotated, 
1953, which provide for filing either a Request for Reconsideration with the 
State Engineer or an appeal with the appropriate District Court. A Request for 
Reconsideration must be filed witfr the State Engineer within 20 days of the date 
of this Decision. However, a Request for Reconsideration is not a prerequisite 
to filing a court appeal. A court appeal must be filed within 30 days after the 
date of this Decision, or if a Request for Reconsideration has been filed, within 
30 days after the date the Request for Reconsideration is denied. A Request for 
Reconsideration is considered denied when no action is taken 20 days after the 
Request is filed. 
Dated this 19th day of June, 1995. 
RLM:KU:mw 
Mailed a copy of the foregoing Memorandum Decision this 19th day of June, 1995, 
to: 
Terracor/Leucadia 
529 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, UT 84103 
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c/o Clark R, Fowcett 
58 North 200 East 
Hurricane, UT 84737 
Washington County Water Conservancy District 
136 North 100 East, Suite 1 
St. George, UT 84770 
Winding River Associates 
c/o Jeffrey N. Starkey, Attorney 
P.O. Box 400 
St. George, UT 84771-0400 
Dallin W. Jensen 
c/o Parsons, Behle & Latimer 
201 South Main 
P.O. Box 11898 
Salt Lake City, UT 84147 
City of St. George 
Attn: Wayne McArthur 
175 East 200 North 
St. George, UT 84770 
